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Chapter 1

“Penn Central was created by a merger six years ago, and for the past four years it’s been
a downhill run.”1 Such were the words voiced by a throaty narrator in a video released by the
Penn Central Corporation—the daughter of a merger of the northeastern railroad giants and
former rivals New York Central Railroad and Pennsylvania Railroad—in 1974. Immediately
following these ominous words, the picture displays a roadweary box car coasting through
turnouts and switch points in a gravity hump yard somewhere on the vast system, which
subsequently leaves the rails in abrupt fashion and comes to a grinding and screeching halt in the
tainted snow. This video, now infamous among transportation scholars and enthusiasts across the
country, constitutes a plea, and one that is almost painful to watch. The nearly 30minute film
presents itself as the antithesis of an infomercial. Instead of offering the viewer with pleasant
images of satisfaction, one is instead bombarded with jarring scenes of decay, disuse and despair.
Machine shop employees gripe about the cold and ineffective repair facilities and engineers tout
the ramshackle state of the company’s motive power, and all of the dialogue is complemented by
a cascade of the crashing and grinding destruction of the corporation’s physical assets. The film
is surreal throughout and its mood depressingly dark, especially in light of the usual images of
living, breathing, teeming industry to which the American is typically exposed.
Just over a hundred years prior, American railroads claimed the unprecedented feat of
traversing the entirety of the North American continent. At Promontory Point, Utah, two
locomotives, the Jupiter and the No. 119 met pilot to pilot in an event which was broadcast

Penn Central, “This is the Penn Central,” YouTube, accessed November 10, 2016,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHmyYqfNYnc
1
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nationwide via telegraph and is still memorialized today. In the years following, the railroad
industry gained unprecedented power. In the late 19th century and the opening years of the 20th,
much policymaking impetus was focused on checking the power of the railroads. Public
sentiment largely opposed the monolithic strength wielded by the industry, and the federal
government both strove to keep the power in check through regulating policies such as
ratesetting as well as attempting to maintain the railroads as a public good through mandating
equity of infrastructure among communities and setting standard rates. The importance of these
regulations is demonstrated through the multitude of jurisprudence and lawmaking dedicated to
the rail regulation. For the next half century, the regulatory scheme oscillated somewhat between
ideological poles, but all the while avoiding what could be described as a laissesfaire approach.
However, by the mid1970s, the railroad industry was on its proverbial knees. Crippled
by the expansion and subsidization of automobile transport and hampered by antiquated
regulations, railroad companies were merging, deferring maintenance and cutting service across
the country in an attempt to stay solvent. The aforementioned film highlights the railroad
industry in this period; its purpose was to entice the federal government into “saving” the
railroads through financial assistance. However, what occurred between 1971 and 1980 was
distinctly more drastic. In a series of acts of heretofore unseen scope, Congress widely
deregulated railroads through the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, while nearly
simultaneously nationalizing intercity passenger rail service through the creation of the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, and northeastern freight rail transport through the
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail).
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The 1970s represent a pivotal point in the ongoing saga of railroad history and policy.
While it might be viewed simply as a disparate set of regulation modifications, this work views it
much differentlyas a time during which much of the railroad industry as it had come to be
known became modified, mutated and, in some cases, vanished completely. To even the casual
observer, the public face of railroads across the nation changed. Passenger transportation across
the nation lost much of its extensive infrastructure, service which was once ubiquitous in small
towns and villages across the nation vanished, and that transportation was no longer carried out
by a vast variety of motive power and rolling stock owned by numerous railroad corporations,
but instead by homogenous silver, red and blue equipment that remains the hallmark of intercity
passenger rail service to this day. The freight railroad industry, likewise, was characterized by
service to progressively fewer destinations operated by fewer and larger entities.
While these changes may seem slight or insignificant to the disinterested observer, the
ramifications of the regulatory changes of the 1970s have remained relevant in the public policy
realm since their implementation, and continue to provide the basis for often contentious and
heated debates today. Freight railroad corridors, which once constituted a dense network, have
become vastly reduced in number, posing issues both for the handling increases in commodities
such crude oil and natural gas and for their reactivation in communities which have become
opposed to their presence, sparking complex conflicts between citizens, corporations and
multiple levels of government. Amtrak has been perennially at issue in Congress, both as the
basis of touted policy initiatives and a favorite whipping boy. It elicits as disparate opinions as
VicePresident Joseph Biden, who has long advocated on its behalf and utilized it as a means of
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transport, to Representative John Mica, who has labeled it a “Sovietstyle” operation and called
for its immediate privatization.2
The railroad policies of the 1970s fundamentally changed the ways in which the railroad
industry interacts with both American citizens and all levels of government. However, while
much scholarship has been devoted to the formulation of railroad regulatory policy in the early
days of policy creation especially in the early twentieth century, precious little scholarly energy
in the discipline of Political Science has been dedicated to the pivotal time period in question.
Largely, scholars have shied away from approaching the topic of railroad deregulation because
of its unclear nature and the nonlinear nature of its trajectory. For example Derthrick and Quick,
in their study of deregulatory policy, note that they avoided addressing the issue of railroad
deregulation because its institution was “less pure” than that of other industries, such as airlines
and telecommunications.3 Nonetheless, this work will seek to address the phenomenon of
bifurcated policy change through the lens of path dependency literature.
The literature which does exist on this time period is, for the most part, tangential to the
fundamental changes affected by the policies themselves and fails to account for basic questions
surrounding these policies. Largely, the policy changes are chalked up to increased competition
from the automobile or growing inefficiencies in the methods of transportation used by the
railroads. However, these explanations fail to account for the dualistic approach of both
nationalization and deregulation which occurred in this period, as well as the political ideologies
of both actors and constituents which underlie these changes. I will attempt to explain this
conundrum of the dualistic policy approach through the application of literature on railroad
Diamond, Alexandra and Jeremy Jaffe, "GOP Rep. John Mica: Amtrak 'Sovietstyle operation'," CNN, accessed

November 10, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/15/politics/shusterdefendsamtrakspending/
3
Derthrick, Martha and Paul J. Quirk, 

The Politics of Deregulation (
Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), 14.
2
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regulation, especially those on earlier eras of railroad regulatory policy as well as original
research into the congressional attitudes which precipitated these changes.
In attempting to explain the “diverging approach” of the federal government to railroad
policy in the 1970s, this work argues that the policies of intense regulation and national control
led to a continuation of that policy through the nationalization efforts of the Rail Passenger
Service Act and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act.4 Faced with a nearly a century of
nationally oriented railroad policy, the costs of divergence from established policy would have
been high. However, by the end of the 1970s, I argue that several factors, including the
exogenous shock of the northeastern railroad meltdown, the impetus of the president and the
interaction of other institutional policy with established regulatory regime and changing attitudes
toward the railroads as an industry caused a change in regulatory policy.
Review of Literature
To say that the phenomenon of railroad deregulation and nationalization in the 1970s has
not sparked scholarly interest would be untrue. Numerous works have been written concerning
this pivotal era, as well as the politics, history and economics thereof. However, what is lacking
from the body of literature is a comprehensive analysis which considers both nationalization and
deregulation together. Furthermore, analysis of the political side of the deregulatory saga has
been rather lacking.
Authors who discuss railroad regulatory policy from the mid19th to mid20th century do
so using two main streams. Primarily, much of the research relies on economic theory with
political undertones, suggesting that regulatory schemes are based on rational decisions on the

In case it is lost on the reader, the title of this work refers to a specific railroad signal aspect which governs the

changing of tracks at reduced speed.
4
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part of the government that can largely be explained through a monetary lens. The second, more
applicable body of literature consists of analyses by policy and legal scholars on the trajectory
and ramifications of railroad regulatory policy.
The first body of literature on railroad regulation focuses primarily on the economic side
of railroad deregulation. Authors such as Theodore Keeler5 analyze the governmental regulation
of railroads, however, these studies are less useful in that their research comes through the lens
of transportation economics, and focuses specifically on the formation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the railroad industry’s response to regulation. However, while
Keeler does shed some light on the 1970s railroad reorganization, his work occurs at a time so
close to the nexus of this tumultuous era that his analysis is less insightful, and his comments on
deregulation form more of a postscript than an actual continuation of his analysis. Steven
Usselman’s book 
Regulating Railroad Innovation 
also fails to continue his analysis of railroad
regulation to the era in question.6 Interestingly, however, Usselman sets the stage for further
developments in railroad policy by connecting political motivations with technological
innovations and business practices, a narrative which is continued by Colin Leach concerning
technocratic political actors and government policy in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
in the years directly preceding the ones in question.7
Other authors have specifically focused on the era of deregulation and reorganization,
such as Friedlaender and Spady.8 Their work on freight regulations contains indepth analysis of

Keeler, Theodore E. 

Railroads, Freight and Public Policy: Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity,
(Washington: Brookings, 1983).
6
Usselman, Steven W. 

Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology and Politics in America 18401920,
(Cambridge: Cambridge, 2002).
7
Leach, Colin. "Waiting for Supertrain: Trains, Technocracy, and the Great Society." NA, 2014.

8
Freidlander, Ann F. and Richard H. Spady, 

Freight Transport Regulation: Equity, Efficiency and Competition in
the Rail and Trucking Industries, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981).
5
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the effects of railroad deregulation, while its focuses more heavily on its industrial and technical
economic effects. Richard Saunders of Clemson University has penned multiple books on the
railroad industry, and several specifically on the period in question. His 1978 work 
The Railroad
Mergers and the Coming of Conrail
provides a careful look at specifically the formation of the
Consolidated Rail Corporation, and while he does so from largely a historical and economic
perspective, he does provide some insights into the political process of its formulation.9 Two
other works by Saunders, 
Merging Lines 
and 
Main Lines
, provide an analysis of the 1970s and
its precipitating events from an industry perspective. 10 11 Similarly, James Burns (1988) focuses
on industrial side of railroad reorganization, while providing occasional forays into the political
realm.12 A similar analysis of the industrial side of railroad reorganization comes in the form of
Gallamore and Meyers’ 2014 work 
American Railroads. 13 Several other works provide direction
in the broader history of the railroad industry in the 1970s. 
The Wreck of the Penn Central 
by
Daughen and Bizin is a seminal work in the realm of railroad history, and provides guidance on
some of the specifics of the northeastern railroad crisis not readily available elsewhere.14 Stover’s
1970 book 
The Life and Decline of the American Railroad 
is also key in providing insights
concerning the industrial history of the railroad prior to deregulation.15 Holbrook’s 1947 work
also provided historical insights for this research, albeit with less applicability.16

aunders, Richard, 
S
Railroad Mergers and the Coming of Conrail, 
(Westport: Greenwood, 1978).
Saunders, Richard, 

Merging Lines: American Railroads 19001970
, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University, 2001).
11
Saunders, Richard, 

Main Lines
, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University, 2003).
12
Burns, James. 

Railroad Mergers and the Language of Unification
. (Portland: Greenwood, 1998).
13
Gallamore, Robert E. and John R. Meyer, 

American Railroads: Decline and Renaissance in the Twentieth
Century
, (Cambridge: Harvard, 2014), 188.
14
Daughen, Joseph R. and Peter Bizen, 

The Wreck of the Penn Central, 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
15
Stover, John F. 

The Life and Decline of the American Railroad
, (New York: Oxford, 1970).
16
Holbrook, Stuart H., 

The Story of American Railroads
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One of the more fascinating politicallyoriented works to analyze the specific period of
deregulation and reorganization is Wesley and Wilson’s study of individual motivations within
Congress concerning rail regulations.17 These authors begin to probe at the heart of political
motivations during this period, providing a glimpse of both ideology and calculus missed by
many other scholars of this period. In a similar vein, Southern and Cosenza provide a
comparative analysis of rail service abandonments and preservations under the separate
regulatory structure of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Surface Transportation
board.18
Scholars have also sought to address more recent developments in railroad regulations, as
well as the ramifications of the drastic change thereof in the 1970s. Marc Levinson provides such
a narrative in his piece “Two Cheers for Discrimination.”19 Levinson deftly provides new
insights therein by addressing the understudied effects of ratesetting discrimination under the
two distinct regulatory regimes. While Levinson’s study is inherently rooted in political analysis,
it stands apart from earlier political analyses and focuses more closely on economic outcomes.
Overall, however, the economic point of view is less useful for this analysis as it provides little
insight into the policy aspects of deregulation.
The second body of scholarship in the aggregate describes railroad policy as a function of
policymaking decisions which are focused on maintaining railroads not so much as a solvent
industry but rather as a public good and in the public interest. The broad trajectory of railroad

Wilson, Kevin and Wesley Hendrickson, "Voting, Regulation and the Railroad Industry: An

Analysis of Private and Public Interest Voting Patterns." 
Review of Industrial Organization,
(2013): 2239.
18
Cosenza, Robert and Neil Southern, "Regulation of Rail Line Abandonments: A Perspective of the Policies of the

Interstate Commerce Commision and the Surface Transportation Board,"
Journal of Transportation Law,
(2011):
225270.
19
Levinson, Marc, "Two Cheers for Discrimination: Deregulation and Efficiency in the Reform of U.S. Freight

Transportation, 19761998," 
Enterprise and Society
, (2009): 178215.
17
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policy, as described by these authors, is one that describes railroad policy as becoming
increasingly restrictive over time, especially in light of the trustbusting measures of the early
20th century in which railroads were highly implicated. While these works are illustrative of
early trends in railroad regulation, the main shortcoming of this body of work is that it fails to
account for the drastic changes in question. Works that do focus specifically on the 1970s
railroad policy changes are mainly works of industrial history, and fail to provide any real
analysis of policy development.
Authors and scholars of early railroad policy tend to frame their analyses within a
specific narrative arc, focusing largely on statebuilding and the role of political institutions, with
minor emphasis on political ideology. Multiple scholars and authors have analyzed the topic of
railroad reorganization and many of their works follow a similar narrative—typical of this
analysis are the works of Colleen Dunlavy, Zachary Callen, Vagel Keller and Theodore
Keeler.20 21 22 23 In particular, scholars of this early period identify a fairly distinct policy arc, in
which railroad regulation moves progressively to a greater scope with more national control of
railroad strategic business decisions, especially regarding geographic placement and ratesetting.
Colleen Dunlavy provides a useful summation of early American railroad regulatory policy in
her comparison of the United States and Prussia. She states:
Both states sought, moreover, to regulate the new transportation technology in the “public
interest.” Prevailing practice in both countries treated railroads as quasipublic
enterprises, even when capital lay entirely in private hands. This reflected the twin facts
that the railroads were organized as corporate enterprises and that they served as
unlavy, Coleen, 
D
Politics and Industrialization,
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994).
Callen, Zachary, "Congress and the Railroads: Federalism, American Political Development, and the Migration of

Policy Responsibility," 
American Politics Research
, 2011.
22
Keller, Vagel C. "Capitalism, Politics and Railroads in Jacksonian New England," 

Business History Review
,
(2004): 514
23
Keeler, Theodore E. 

Railroads, Freight and Public Policy: Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity,
(Washington: Brookings, 1983).
20
21

12
“common carriers,” offering transportation services to the public…a grant of
incorporation implied that the company had passed a test of public usefulness, while their
status as common carriers gave them a distinctive legal position. As Lemuel Shaw, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, remarked in 1836, because a
railroad was privately owned and operated, it was ‘not the less a public work…the public
accommodations is the ultimate object.” 24
Viewed a public good, although one that could be less than benign when allowed to
flourish without supervision, the railroads became the subjects of some of the most
comprehensive early regulation in history. As mentioned above, regulatory policy was not
completely stagnant—it fluctuated somewhat given administration at that time. At one level or
another, most literature on the subject of early railroad regulation acknowledges this pattern of
increasing regulation over time, while, unlike other scholarly work, the sources maintain little
connection with one another.
Dunlavy’s work, 
Politics and Industrialization
, typifies much of the work on early
railroad regulation. Although part of a larger opus regarding various forms of industrial
regulations, what is particularly useful about her book is that it discusses the politics and
ideology of railroad promotion within the United States, especially in the early years of the
formation of railroad policy.25 Her analysis is particularly useful in that she specifically ties
railroad regulatory policy to political parties and their respective ideologies, particularly in the
area of statelevel policy formation, highlighting some of the change in policy over time.
Zachary Callen also focuses on the interaction of state and federal policy within American
federalism, focusing on how the United States’ dualistic governmental system influenced

24
25

unlavy, Coleen, 
D
Politics and Industrialization,
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994), 7273.
Dunlavy, Coleen, 

Politics and Industrialization,
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994).
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railroad infrastructure formation in the rapid expansion of railroads in the antebellum period.26
Also typical of this analysis is a focus on statebuilding ; an early period study by Vagel Keller
provides insights into railroad policy formation in the Jacksonian era, providing insights into the
very formative years of regulatory policy.27 Nice provides a similar analysis, although focusing
chronologically later on state policy decisions regarding the preservation of railroad corridors
within their borders.28 Dilger’s book 
American Transportation Policy 
also explicates the changes
of railroad policy over time.29
Closer analyses of the development of transportation regulation are found in works such
as Berk’s 
Alternative Tracks
, which explores the relationship between the development of public
policy and the American industrial system. Specific insights into the role of the Interstate
Commerce Commission’s role in railroad development comes from Hoogenboom and
Hoogenbloom’s work on the history of the railroad regulatory regime.30 Fishlow, in addition,
gives further analysis of regulatory policy and early American economic history.31
This thesis, therefore, explores a mostly untapped area of important policy change. In
order to provide a broader analysis of this area, I will look to other repositories of research,
particularly that concerning path dependency and American political development. These fields
provide useful insights into the American political system and will allow it to probe further into
the implications of this issue to the wider field of study.
Callen, Zachary, "Congress and the Railroads: Federalism, American Political Development, and the Migration of
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American Transportation Policy, 
(Westport: Praeger, 2003).
30
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(Toronto: Norton,
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31
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What is evident from this review is not the paucity of literature regarding railroad
regulation and reorganization in the 1970s, as indeed a body of work on this subject exists.
However, what is clear is that arc of policy which was identified by authors of early railroad
regulation cannot easily explain the rapid transition to a deregulated system within their models.
This analysis of the reorganization of railroad regulation will seek to rectify this lack of
continuation in the literature by continuing the narrative begun by scholarly treatment of earlier
railroad regulations. However, in order to do so, another body of literature must be tapped to
help to provide an explanation. Gaining a sufficiently analytical image of the trajectory of
railroad policy in the United States, and especially within the conflictual dynamics of the 1970s
and 80s, necessitates a theoretical framework within which to work.
This research looks at railroad policy through the lens of path dependency, In this vein, I
will also look to scholars of temporal politics and path dependency. At the forefront of this field
is Paul Pierson of the University of California, Berkeley. His seminal work, 
Politics in Time
, will
heavily inform the analysis of this research.32 The concept of path dependency as developed in
this book will provide direction to the narrative of this work, particularly regarding the
development of policy up to the Staggers Act. are Stephen Skowronek of Yale University and
Karen Orren of the University of California, Los Angeles. Their fielddefining book, 
The Search
for American Political Development,
has proven to be critical to the APD field 33 . In this work,
they explore the concept of “paths,” or familiar trends which public policy tends to follow. As
this work seeks to analyze not only a specific period in political history but also the larger trends
in railroad regulation, the model which Orren and Skowronek propose will be integral to my
ierson, Paul, 
P
Politics in Time, 
(Princeton: Princeton, 2004).
Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek, 

The Search for American Political Development, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge,
2004).
32
33
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work. Orren and Skowronek also engage with other American Political Development scholars,
such as Paul Pierson.
The work of these scholars will provide an analytical lens which will be used to continue
the narrative begun by other authors on earlier incarnations of railroad regulatory policy,
applying established concepts of political thought and development to this underinvestigated
area of radical policy change. Primarily, I argue that path dependency, which is defined as the
tendency of policy to follow set “paths,” with an increasing likelihood of maintaining course
over time. While path dependence can describe the continuation of nationalistic policy, we must
also call upon the theory of “intercurrence” espoused by Orren and Skweronek, or the clash
between institutions, in order to describe the simultaneous change in the industry.
Methodology
In order to accomplish a comprehensive analysis of the topic at hand, the methodological
approach used in this work will be based in a detailed survey of the primary sources available
concerning the debate over the implementation of the various laws in question. Primarily, this
approach will consist of holistic consideration of the transcripts of debates, proposals and
hearings surrounding the movement of the bills through Congress. Primarily, I will use the
Congressional Record to investigate the content of speeches, hearings and other discussions on
the passage of these acts, which are extensive and yet largely unexplored by the published
literature. While some limited previous scholarship has attempted to analyze support of the acts
through the application of votecounting and analysis of key talking points, my research will
follow a much more qualitative approach, using inductive methods to draw new conclusions
from the available data and looking at the broader scope of the framing of the acts within the
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context of their passage. This methodology sets work apart from others which have touched on
this subject—most other authors have merely considered the public manifestations of the these
acts, while this analysis will consider them from introduction to adoption. This will entail
focusing specifically on the legislation, especially inside the institution in its presentation to
political actors.. Given the ideological nature of this analysis, probing sources for the motivations
of political actors is fundamental to this work. Unlike past works, which have consisted more
simply of counting the votes of individual members of Congress or assessing their geographic
distribution, the approach used in the remainder of this work will present a set of findings which
probes at the heart of the motivations and justification behind the rapid change in policy.
Given that what is perhaps so surprising about policy change in this period is its distinct
break with the regulatory trajectory which preceded it, my analysis of primary sources will also
look closely at normative policymaking and pathdependent approaches to regulatory issues.
While this paper argues that what we see in the 1970s is both path dependent and intercurrent, it
is necessary also to look to the sources for evidence of normative trajectories in order to continue
the narrative of railroad policy begun by other scholars, looking for the ways in which previous
legislation has impacted the current regulatory regime instituted in this period.
On a more macro level, this approach will not fail to look at the broader pressures,
beyond ideology, which must be considered to take into account institutional queues and other
influences on the behavior of the actors involved. While not apparent directly from the
transcripts of hearing presentations or floor speeches, these motivations can be fleshed out
through other historical records. Although other authors have used this approach to some extent
in their analysis of these events, this paper would be remiss not to take factors beyond ideology
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into account. In short, the remainder of this work will present a previously unseen depth of
analysis and probing of the record in order to get at the heart of the ideological and institutional
factors at play in this time period.
Chapter Outline
The subsequent chapters of this work will be dedicated to a systematic analysis of the
source material which follows a historically logical progression. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to
an overview of past regulation, beginning with the early regulatory structure and focusing on
regulation under the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) through the 1960s. In the third
chapter, the work will highlight the policy changes which precipitated the formation of Amtrak,
inclusive, but not limited to, the Passenger Rail Service Act and subsequent clarifying acts which
further modified the relationship between the government and the passenger rail industry.
Chapter 4 will provide analysis of the freight railroad regulatory changes, particularly the
Railroad Reform and Revitalization Act of 1976 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. Chapter 5
will discuss the calculus of Congressional actors on railroad deregulatory acts, focusing
specifically on the Congressional debates. In conclusion, Chapter 6 will provide overall
conclusions and findings from the analysis, synthesizing policy trajectories over time and
applying scholarly literature to the conclusions of this work.
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Chapter 2
Regulation Under the Interstate Commerce Act:
Private Roads, Public Interest
The early history of railroad regulation in the United States is generally marked by slow
development and gradual change toward more progressive and nationalistic ideals. Beginning
with small, statelevel restrictions, railroad regulation proliferated and nationalized along with
th
popular sentiment against the industry. Throughout the later part of the 19
century and through

the 1920s, the level to which the federal government regulated grew, and as railroads
progressively became a more integral part of American life, so too did the aspects of the industry
which the government sought to regulate, ranging from rates to trackage abandonment.
The purpose of this chapter is not to outline the specific provision of railroad regulatory
cases and acts, but rather to provide an overview of the general trajectory of railroad regulation
up the era of deregulation. This will provide the background for the primary analysis of this
work, specifically providing insight as to the nature of regulation of railroads as a public good
under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Early Regulation
th
While railroads in the early part of the 19
century consisted of but a few miles of

unstandardized trackage and infrastructure, the rapid growth of the new form of transportation
over the ensuing decades resulted in a massive, largely standardized network of competing
companies, each with largely exclusive rightsofway. The rapid growth of railroads began to
supplant and largely succeeded in obviating the need for other modes of transportation,
particularly canals. As railroad networks rose to the fore as the primary means of transportation,
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and more importantly, the shipping of commodities, railroad shipping rates, and the fixing
thereof, become a pertinent and contentious political issue.34 Because many cities across the
nation were served by more than one railroad company, while smaller communities normally
only had a single road from which to choose, the rates charged by the companies became
paramount to those who relied on the railroads for subsistence, and especially farmers, and their
respective granges, whose livelihood was tied largely to the railroad.35
The first regulation of railroads originated in state regulatory commissions, first in
Connecticut and New Hampshire and later, in stronger iterations, in states such as Iowa and
Illinois.36 While the first commissions simply sought railroad compliance with their charters,
and, in some instances, mandated safety procedures and inspections, later, particularly
Midwestern commissions began to regulate rate setting between destinations within the state.37
The strong agricultural base of the Midwest provided the incentive for the respective states to
enact ratesetting regulation, especially in light of the investments of many of the state's’ farmers
in the railroad system. When the railroads continued to expand and favor larger markets over
smaller towns, infuriated landowners supported state legislation against rate discrimination and
the monopolistic practices of railroads.38
However, state regulation of proved to be untenable rather quickly. The railroad network
began to become more comprehensive and national in scope, suggesting more federal regulation;
more importantly, however, railroad companies began to challenge the state's’ right to regulate
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commerce. The tension between individual states and railroads was first manifested in 
Munn v.
Illinois
, in which the railroad sued the state in the Supreme Court for interference with business.
39

The Court decided in favor of the state, and the era of regulation of railroads was officially


ushered in. Specifically and importantly, the Court upheld the states’ right to set rates, stating
that the railroads were “engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest” and that
they could “charge only a reasonable sum.”40 The result of the 
Munn 
case was wide latitude for
states in regulating commerce, and even interstate commerce given the lack of federal regulation.
However, more importantly, the case set the precedent for regarding railroads as private entities
which functioned in the public good, essentially as public utilities. In short, 
Munn 
declared that
railroads were “agents of the state.” 41
Quickly, however, regulation became a salient issue on the national level. William P.
Hepburn, as chair of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, led an investigation of
commercial railroad practices, which produced a stinging indictment, centering around “rate
discrimination, stock watering and favoritism towards monopolies.” 42 Nonetheless, even with
the introduction of a bill in the House in 1879 propelled by Representative John H. Reagan,
federal railroad regulation would not be instituted until 1887.43 The groundwork for this bill lay
in the Supreme Court case 
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company
v. 
Illinois, 
which
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narrowed the extent to which states could regulate railroad ratesetting, placing that prerogative
in the hand of Congress.44
The progeny of the 1887 compromise between the House and Senate was the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the first national regulatory body.45 Nevertheless, due to the
compromise affected by the House and Senate reconciliation of the provisions of the Reagan Bill
and the Senate’s alternative, the Cullum Bill, the actual powers of the Commission were slight.
Furthermore, jurisprudence toward the Commission was less than favorable, and several court
decisions over the ensuing decade continued to further weaken the body .46
Growth of the Interstate Commerce Commission
With the onset of depression in 1893, and the national attention attuned to more pressing
matters, railroads began to perpetrate open violations of the ICC’s provisions. The Court further
weakened the ICC in 
Alabama Midland v. Interstate Commerce Commission 
and 
Smyth v. Ames
,
with the later completely eradicating the remaining little ratesetting power possessed by the
ICC.47
Under the Roosevelt administration, national railroad regulation again came to the fore,
particularly through the Northern Securities Case and the Elkins Act. Instigated by Roosevelt,
the Court ruled in 
Northern Securities Co. v. United States 
against the agglomerated railroad
companies in the northwest. 48 Furthermore, the Elkins Act of 1903 stipulated that freight rebates
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were illegal; however, it granted the ICC no further ratesetting power. Both the Elkins Act and
the 
Northern Securities 
case had little effect on the railroads in practice, serving more
symbolically as a means of easing the public angst against the growing power of the railroad
companies and as a purported victory for the Roosevelt administration .49
However, the ire of shippers against the railroads continued to grow in ensuing years, and
by 1905, shippers and business groups had drowned congress in requests for action in
augmentation of ICC power. Congress, on the contrary, was reluctant to empower the ICC any
further, and Roosevelt similarly made clear his opposition to granting the Commission
ratefixing power. While a bill in response to the shippers’ outcry initially languished in
Congress, Roosevelt’s recommendation that the ICC be able to set maximum rates guided the
parameters of the bill which was finally passed in 1906.50 Known as the Hepburn Act, the bill
was propelled by the Republican contingent in Congress by means of the attachment of the
Allison amendment, which provided for judicial review of the law.51
Nevertheless, even the relatively strong Hepburn Act failed to affect significant change in
the industry given that it was difficult to implement and that the judicial review provision made
the ICCs rulings able to be easily struck down by the courts. The already wary public recognized
the ineffectiveness of the law, and the act’s sponsor, William Peters Hepburn, was accordingly
and swiftly defeated in the following election.52 Yet, despite the ineffectiveness of the Hepburn
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Act, the depression which followed in 1907 turned the national attention from railroads once
again. The remaining years of the Roosevelt administration were marked by little attention to the
issue of railroad regulation, and even ignoring of a large part of the Hepburn Act on the part of
the Roosevelt administration.53
The Taft administration’s conservative leanings guided the trajectory of railroad
regulation toward a restriction of ICC powers. Nonetheless, due to a proposal by a unified group
of Southern railroads to Congress for a rate increase. The proposal angered both Congress and
the Taft administration, and the result was a greatly strengthened ICC by means of the provisions
of the MannElkins Act, which was passed in the wake of the Southern railroads’ proposal, as
well as a an amendment to the 1887 Act to Regulate Commerce.54 55
The MannElkins Act proved to be the single most progressive piece of legislation in the
history of railroad regulation, and the authority it provided to the Commission provided the
necessary framework for the ICC to finally provide regulatory oversight to the railroads.
Following World War I, during which railroads were temporarily nationalized, Congress passed
the Transportation Act of 1920. Aimed at attempting to successfully return the railroad industry
to its previous privatized state, the act modified some of the existing prerogatives of the ICC,
specifically in four distinct ways. It allowed for the ICC to set minimum rates, it elevated the
regulation of entry and abandonment of rights of way to the ICC from the states, it allowed for
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the ICC to promote mergers and to issue direct subsidies to railroad companies (Keeler 1983,
25).56
The regulatory structure of the 1920 act was left largely intact for the next three decades.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the Transportation Act of 1940 both enlarged the ICCs power
in the realm of other forms of transportation, specifically in barge and truck transportation and
amended the 1920 act, charging the ICC with bringing what the act called “sound economic
conditions” by means of the regulations of the various industries.57 The 1948 Bullwinkle Act
approved the use of ratesetting bureaus by the railroads, which had long been in practice, but
nonetheless questionable from the perspective of antitrust laws.58
Industry Collapse
The seeds of deregulation were first sown in the 1950s. While much of the regulation
prior to this era seemed to be relatively favorable to the railroad industry, especially following
the first World War, competition from the trucking industry began to incise the railroads’
previously formidable lead in commodity transportation.59 Moreover, while railroads sought to
innovate and integrate with other transportation modes using technologies such as intermodal
and traileronflatcar service, the ICC frequently denied railroad requests for ratelowering.60
While truck and barge transportation relied primarily on subsidized transportation infrastructure,
railroads continued to privately maintain exclusive rightsofway, and ones which were subject
to abandonment and marketentry regulation. In addition, highway and canal transportation
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lobbies pushed for the continuation of the current regulatory scheme, as the comparatively
lenient regulation toward those industries produced favorable financial results at the expense of
the railroads.61
By the mid1950s, railroads began a concerted push for greater selfdetermination in
ratesetting.62 Their lobbying efforts, combined with the 1958 recession, produced the
Transportation Act of 1958, which primarily prevented the ICC from instating ratesetting in
order to protect a particular industry under its purview.63 It also allowed for the ICC to grant
direct loans to the railroads, and for the Commission to allow for the discontinuation of
passenger service, a privilege which had up to that point, fallen to the states.64 The profitability
of passenger service, always a tenuous venture for railroad companies, had risen nearly to the
point of excess, swallowing up twofifths of all railroad revenue.65 Yet, in practice, the
Commission continued to mandate the operation of clearly unprofitable passenger service, and
the loans to railroads such as the ErieLackawanna Railroad and New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad proved to be nothing more than a temporary stopgap.66
By the 1960s, the American railroad industry, particularly in the northeast, was
characterized by bankruptcy, unprofitability and massive financial losses, and deferred
maintenance and resultant deterioration of physical plant. Throughout the decade, an increasing
number of the former mammoths of the railroad industry fell, and much of the nation’s rail
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infrastructure seemed in jeopardy. It was within this context that the regulatory changes of the
1970s were set to occur.
Conclusion
The regulation of railroads under the Interstate Commerce Commission, while not always
steady in its trajectory, was defined by restrictive regulatory practices which regulated railroads
in a way more analogous to a public utility than a private corporation. The Court’s jurisprudence
in 
Munn 
ensured that the concept of railroads as a public good was solidified in federal policy.
There are multiple theories concerning the purpose and origin of the restrictive regulation
of railroads. Often, scholars have considered regulation to be an outgrowth of an interest in
populist policies and guaranteeing rates for farmers and other agriculturalists.67 Still other
scholars have argued that regulations were primarily beneficial to railroads themselves,
guaranteeing them steady incomes from the frozen rates.68 Regardless of the underlying purpose
of the regulation, its results were clearrailroads were subject to an intense regulatory regime
which treated railroads as a public good. It was this mentality which, this work argues, led to the
development of nationalization policies in the early 1970s, a phenomenon which will be explored
in later chapters. The continuation of railroad policy in a manner which favored heavy regulatory
regimes can easily be explained as a product of path dependency, with changes to the regulatory
system becoming less likely over time. With railroads continuing to be integral to the national
transportation system through the late 1930s, it is no wonder that the regulatory regime
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continued to favor heavy regulation, and the unlikelihood of divergence from this trajectory can
be explained through path dependence.

28
Chapter 3
Precipitation and Nationalization:
Industry Collapse and the Formation of Government Corporations

While the Staggers Act was first major federal measure since the 1920s that was aimed
specifically at deregulating railroads on a major scale, its enactment was far from isolated.
Nearly a decade before the passage of Staggers, the federal government was already deeply
involved in seeing to the wellbeing of the United States’ rail network. Precipitating factors were
key in the developments which lead to the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, and while there
were a host of changes which arose during the decade prior, there were two specific
governmentled measures which constituted this intervention. The formation of Amtrak in 1970
and the creation of the Consolidated Rail Corporation in 1976 marked the first major
nationalization efforts related to railroads outside of emergency wartime scenarios in the nation’s
history. The genesis of these two entities was indicative of both the precipitous decline in the
conditions of American railroad service at this time and the continued interest on the part of the
federal government in preserving a robust railroad network. Additionally, both corporations
played a critical role in the configuration of current railroad conditions and continue to remain
salient in the national political debate. Yet, the changes which occurred during these decades
were not issues which were merely of issue on the national level, but are also interwoven with
national attitudes towards railroads on the part of the general public. Ideology, while critical to
the national debates over the formation of these entities, was also intrinsic to the underlying
conditions which led to the necessity of their institution.

29
In this chapter, I will outline in a chronological fashion the critical changes in the national
rail system which began around 1968 and continued to the passage of the Staggers Act. While
the examination of this era will be less analytical and more historical than that which is presented
concerning the Staggers Act itself in subsequent chapters, this analysis will serve to set up
the

conditions in which Staggers was executed as well as explicate the underlying factors which
necessitated regulatory change.
Northeastern Meltdown: Mergers and the Collapse of the Penn Central
By 1968, the condition of railroads in the Northeastern United States was a in a state of
severe decay. Deferred maintenance, caused by a lack of funds on the part of the railroads which
operated in this traditionally industrialized area, made efficient shipping difficult, revenues
almost nonexistent, and the rehabilitation of the facilities and infrastructure necessary to return
to efficiency nearly impossible.69 The continuous failure on the part of the railroads to improve
conditions perpetrated a constant feedback loop of instability, inefficiency and exponential
decay. The railroad companies themselves attempted to better themselves in multiple ways, but
betterment appeared continuously more unattainable.70
The northeast had once been a bastion of the nation's most prestigious, profitable and
active railroads. Railroad corridors crisscrossed the region, backboned by key decadesold
carriers such as the Delaware and Hudson Railroad, the New York Central Railroad and the Erie
Railroad.71 These companies served both major markets and diminutive towns, providing critical
service to both. Cities were crisscrossed by a web of steel, and it was not uncommon for even
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mediumsized cities to be served by a halfdozen or more railroads.72 For decades, railroads had
been the preferred mode of transportation for both shipping and passenger travel.73
However, by the middle of the twentieth century, the outlook of American railroads had
changed. Joseph Daughen and Peter Binzen describe the situation in the late 1950s relative to
changes in technology:
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union fired a twentythreeinch aluminum ball into earth
orbit...To compete with the Russians, the United States began pouring billions into this
new means of rapid transit. The Space Age had dawned and it was all very exciting.
Meanwhile, back on the groundhugging railroad tracks, things were going to pot. Train
service was a mockery and a joke, a bitter joke for riders and shippers who couldn’t
understand why the world’s most technologically proficient nation had to put up with
such abominable railroads.74

The situation of the railroads, especially those in the northeast, was truly dire. Between
1956 and 1957, the New York Central Railroad, one of the primary carriers in the northeast,
dropped $19 million in earnings from $28 million to a mere $9 million75 . Other railroads
concurrently experienced similar earning losses at this time, and the ridership of the nation’s
passenger service was declining precipitously. Between 1948 and 1968, the noncommuter
ridership of American railroads had fallen from 35 billion passenger miles to less than 10 billion.
76

The loss of freight traffic, including coal and other natural commodities, also contributed to the

loss in revenues. In New York State alone, the Delaware and Hudson Railroad, ErieLackawanna
Railroad and the Lehigh Valley Railroad lost a significant portion of their coalbased revenues,
with anthracite coal, a primary component of each of the railroad’s revenues, declining to 15 to
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20percent of all freight tonnage by 1966, a number which had dropped from nearly 49percent
in 1900.77
There were several major factors which precipitated the losses which were experienced
by the railroads at this time, primary of which was the growth in the trucking industry.78 As the
highway system expanded, so did the network which roadbased carriers had at their disposal.79
Furthermore, while railroads were increasingly taxed on their rights of way, the trucking industry
was built upon governmentfunded infrastructure which was largely devoid of tax burdens on the
part of the trucking companies.80 In June of 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower’s watershed $25
billion bill that created the Highway Trust Fund was passed.81 While the bill was funded through
both an increase in the federal gas tax (from 2￠to 3￠) and a slight tax on truck infrastructure
itself, the bill opened up major possibilities for long distance road haulage, and the industry
reacted accordingly.82 Shipping by truck experienced a massive boom following the passage of
the highway funding and the commencement of the construction of the highway system.83 By
1930, the United States government had spent almost $1.8 billion on highways and the highway
network, at 90,250 miles, greatly exceeded the mileage of all major “Class I” railroads.84
The passage of the interstate highway system bill package was linked with rhetoric which
not only glorified the highway, automobile and truck as an integral part of American culture, but
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also painted them as necessary to the movement of the nation forward. President Eisenhower
stated in his report to Congress on February 22, 1955:
Our unity as a nation is sustained by free communication of thought and by easy
transportation of people and goods. The ceaseless flow of information through the
Republic is matched by individual and commercial movement over a vast system of
interconnected highways crisscrossing the country and joining it at our national borders
with friendly neighbors to the north and south.85

Eisenhower’s arguments for the passage of the highway legislation were laden with
Jeffersonian rhetoric on the importance of transportation .86 In the wake of the second World War
and the growth of American hegemony, the Interstate Highway System represented an outgrowth
of American primacy on a global scale.87 In addition, the American belief system, which often
equates freedom with mobility vis à vis the automobile, underlies the proclivity of the federal
government in building the Interstate Highway System.88
The problems of the railroads were not limited to that caused by adversarial government
policy which promoted the use of alternate modes of transportation over the railroad network. It
was compounded simply by a decrease in industrial production in the Northeast, coupled with a
simultaneous movement of industry to other parts of the nation.89 Much of the factory production
which had for decades fueled the Northeastern economy simply was no longer present. New
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factories in the midwest and south outcompeted the older, dated factories, to the point to which
when recession hit around 1957, the northeast was adversely affected first, and the railroads
along with it.90
As external forces appeared increasingly adversarial toward the survival of railroads,
many companies began looking within the industry for solutions.91 While the merging of railroad
companies was by no means a new concept, as railroads had toyed with the idea of major
consolidation since the 1920s, the prospect of alliances among companies took on a new allure
for the ailing railroads.92 Most hypothetical railroad mergers focused on the merging of railroads
with little infrastructure redundancy, however James M. Symes, the CEO of the Pennsylvania
Railroad, defied conventional thought on railroad mergers and saw an opportunity to merge with
his company’s greatest and longeststanding rival, the New York Central Railroad.93
The Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central constituted the two main eastwest
rail corridors in the Northeast at the middle of the twentieth century.94 Themselves each the
progeny of a slew of mergers around the turn of the century, both companies were at the time
massive systems with trackage stretching from the eastern seaboard to Chicago and St. Louis.95
Each company’s flagship passenger service, the Pennsylvania’s 
Broadway Limited 
and the New
York Central’s 
20th Century Limited
, were among the most iconic names in passenger
railroading and competed with one another in the New YorktoChicago market for over 65
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years.96 The proposed merger between the two companies was of unprecedented scale in the
history of railroads up to that point. While through the late 1950s and early 1960s the
negotiations between Symes and New York Central chief executive Albert Perlman were
somewhat rocky due to Perlman’s trepidation to join forces with the longtime rival.97 However,
by the mid1960s interest in the merger had rebounded due to a change in the management of the
respective companies.98
The merger of the two companies was approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission
on April 17, 1966, and was predicated upon the acquisition of the failing New York, New Haven
and Hartford Railroad, a smaller failing road based in New England.99 Despite the promising
beginnings of the Penn Central Railroad, as the newly created entity was christened, multiple
factors contributed to its early unprofitability. Primarily, the mandated acquisition of the
unprofitable New Haven Railroad, for which the Penn Central had to pay $125 million, added to
the company’s losses.100 101 In addition, the management teams from both companies (known as
the “red” and “green” teams for the Pennsylvania and New York Central, respectively)
maintained an adversarial attitude toward one another, which manifested itself in not only a
rocky beginning for the company, but continued problems throughout the company’s continued
operation past its formation in 1968. 102 In essence the company continued to operate as two
separate entities.103
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Other factors which were even further out of the company's control also plagued Penn
Central’s quest for solvency. The regulatory climate under the Interstate Commerce Act
precluded the abandonment of redundant infrastructure, making reductive efforts nearly
impossible.104 The operation of passenger service was, however, one of the most onerous
requirements which the company had to bear.105 Given its prime access to nearly every
northeaster market, Penn Central was required to operate extensive passenger service over its
trackage, including over the hightraffic Northeast Corridor as well as the long distance trains to
midwestern terminals. 106 Passenger service had long been a requirement of railroads under the
Interstate Commerce Act.107 While passenger service had rarely generated a profit for any of the
railroads which offered it, it did at least produce significant revenue due to its necessity as a
means of transportation for most of the population prior to the proliferation of the automobile.108
Even after road transportation became a significant portion of the national transportation system,
railroads still succeeded in attracting a modicum of ridership using luxury services.109 It also
served as a point of pride for many American railroads, as railroads competed to provide the
most prestigious service and accommodations.110 However, by the early 1970s, passenger service
had become nothing more than a burden for American railroads. In an attempt to preserve
passenger rail service nationwide and to alleviate railroads such as the Penn Central from this
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increasingly burdensome service, Congress created Amtrak in 1971, the institution of which will
be explored later in this chapter.111
However, the alleviation of passenger rail service from Penn Central did little to slow its
impending demise. The winter of 1970 took a major toll on the railroad’s physical plant,
crippling the railroad’s major rail yard at Selkirk, NY, and paralyzing the entirety of the system.
112

Losing over $375,000 per day, the railroad sustained the worst first quarter for any railroad in

American history.113 Although the company was able to negotiate with banks to secure finances
which it hoped to stop the bleeding from its proverbial wounds, the Penn Central was unable to
recover from the continued collapse of its infrastructure.114 By 1970, the railroad had accrued
longterm debt amounting to almost $1.6 billion.115
The issue of the Penn Central’s impending demise did was not limited only negotiations
within the business community itself. The issue of the collapse of the company and its potential
impact on the rest of the economy spurred a meeting between the Attorney General, Federal
Reserve Board Chairman, the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury, the Budget Bureau
Director and the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors at the White House. While no
specific plans were laid out at the engagement, it demonstrated the ascendence of the issue of
freight railroad collapse to the national level.116
In June of 1970, the Department of Transportation, headed by Secretary of Transportation
John A. Volpe, announced an official, twostage plan that was to save the Penn Central from
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bankruptcy.117 Primarily, the plan would have allowed for the company to receive $200 million
in shortterm loans from the Department of Defense under the Defense Production Act of
1950.118 The justification for the use of such loans was based on the Penn Central’s status as an
essential piece of infrastructure for the transportation of defenserelated freight.119 In addition, it
proposed that Congress authorize the Department of Transportation to grant loans up to $750
million to failing railroads.120
However, the Department of Defense, lead by David Packard, declined to issue the loans
to the Penn Central.121 With the collapse of this critical element of the plan, Secretary Volpe
distanced himself from the assistance of the railroad. With no end to the crisis in sight, the Penn
Central Company filed for bankruptcy on June 20, 1970.122 The failure of the company
constituted the largest bankruptcy of a company up to that point.123
Beginnings of Nationalization: The Formation of Amtrak
Spurred on by the impending demise of the Penn Central Company, the first main effort
by the federal government to salvage rail service came in the form of the creation of the new
nationalized rail network, namely the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak.124 In
May of 1970, Congress began to consider the Rail Passenger Service Act, which authorized the
formation of a publicly funded corporation proposed by the National Association of Railroad
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Passengers as “Railpax,” which would later come to be known as Amtrak, or the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation.125 126 The new entity officially went into operation on May 1,
1971 with the departure of Clocker number 235’s departure from New York’s Penn Station.
According to House Report No. 911580, the express purpose of the newly formed entity was “to
revitalize rail transportation service in the expectation that the rendering of such service along
certain corridors can be made a profitable commercial undertaking.”127
Legally, Amtrak was created as a forprofit corporation registered to the District of
Columbia. It was defined as a “mixedownership government corporation.” and had the
stipulation that it was not expressly a government entity, both of which were defined under the
amendment to the act. 128
While there was no one specific incident or organization which precipitated the creation
of the new national entity; the major push for the creation of Amtrak was primarily from the
railroad industry itself. 129 Seeking to be free of the growing burden of providing passenger rail
service, railroad companies had been petitioning the Interstate Commerce Commission since the
early 1960s to allow them to eliminate major parts of their passenger rail service network, or
allow them to abandon it wholesale.130 However, the commission remained adamant on the
continuation of passenger service, and only allowed for railroads to forego passenger service on

asuik, Laurie,
P
Vault Guide to the Top Transportation Industry Employers, 

(New York: Vault, 2006), 20.
Gallamore, Robert E. and John R. Meyer, 

American Railroads: Decline and Renaissance in the Twentieth
Century
, (Cambridge: Harvard, 2014), 312.
127
Amtak Reform Council, “A Summary of the Current Legislative Provisions Prescribing the Legal and Regulatory

Framework Governing the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),” 2000, 3.
128
Amtak Reform Council, “A Summary of the Current Legislative Provisions Prescribing the Legal and Regulatory

Framework Governing the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),” 2000, 3.
129
Saunders, Richard, 

Railroad Mergers and the Coming of Conrail, 
(Westport: Greenwood, 1978), 299.
130
Gilschinski, Steven, 

The Santa Fe Railway, (
London: Voyaguer, 1997), 96.
125
126

39
a select few lines.131 While passenger rail service remained profitable only in a few select densely
populated corridors, namely those surrounding the BostonWashington Northeast Corridor,
Chicago and Los Angeles, the commission’s mission precluded allowing railroads to abandon
their intercity passenger service, and forced railroads to maintain service upon threats of
revoking their charter if they failed to provide it. 132
Despite the commission’s insistence on the continuation of service, the Penn Central’s
request to discontinue a large portion of its passenger service, namely that west of Buffalo, NY,
and Harrisburg, PA, triggered the realization for the need of federal action on the issue of
passenger rail service. 133 Primarily, the proposal was the result of three main competing ideals
regarding passenger rail service. First, the railroad industry itself, wanting to be rid of the burden
of passenger service entirely, urged Congress to force the ICC to allow them to shed all of their
responsibility for providing passenger rail service.134 However, opposition came from
environmental groups, who believed that the loss of operating railroad service would increase the
demand for much more landuse heavy transportation methods, largely through the increased
construction of roadways and the proliferation of airports to accommodate the overflow of
displaced transportation users.135 Railroad unions also advocated for the continuation of intercity
passenger service by means of federal funding of railroads for reasons that are not unclear.136
However, a Department of Transportation proposal called for an entirely different
solutionthe creation of a government corporation which would operate the nation’s passenger
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rail service while increasing efficiency and modernization at a lower cost.137 However, the Nixon
administration wavered in support of this proposed solution, and finally ordered the Department
of Transportation to refrain from submitting the proposal to Congress.138 The Democratic
Congress was unrelenting in its support of the continuation of railroad passenger service, and
produced a bill which would fully subsidize all passenger railroad service.139 The Nixon
administration, wary of the bill’s potential costliness, reneged on its moratorium of the
Department of Transportation proposal, and allowed the department to enter into negotiations
with congressional leaders.140 Passage of the bill, known as the Rail Passenger Service Act of
1970, occurred rather swiftly, and
Nixon signed the bill into law in
October of that year, with its
provisions set to be enacted
beginning May 1, 1971.141 142
The creation of Amtrak is
revelatory of the United States’
curious relationship to passenger
Fig 3.1 Preliminary Amtrak System143
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rail service specifically and nationalization more broadly. Even into the 1970s, despite all
indications that railroad passenger service had become unpopular among the wider public,
unfavored by the railroad companies themselves, and unsustainable under private management,
both Congress and the Presidency provided support not just for maintaining the status quo of
railroad operations, but also for bringing under the purview of the federal government itself. As
will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, Congress, in debating the passage of the Rail
Passenger Service Act, largely supported the ideal that passenger rail service was not only
essential to the wider transportation system as a whole, but also as an institution which it was
responsible for maintaining in order to forward the public welfare. Though the outworking of the
legislation itself was quite different from earlier laws regarding railroads, the underlying purpose
was quite similarto maintain a national rail system which was primarily geared toward the
wellbeing of consumers. The relationship of the formation of the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation to the conceptualization of railroads as a public good is clear from the United States
Railroad Association’s preliminary system plan goals, which stated that one of Amtrak’s main
goals was the preservation of “essential rail passenger services despite dismal recent trends and
wide anticipation of accelerated discontinuances.”144 Furthermore, Amtrak was also considered
to be an essential piece of the national infrastructure, especially in respect to national security.145
Even Nixon’s ambiguous proclivities are also demonstrative of the deepseated
relationship of railroads to the larger national ethos. The president’s motivations for the passage
of the bill were conflicted by his party’s deepseated opposition to the bill’s tenets, coupled with
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his push for fiscal responsibility.146 However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Nixon’s
upbringing as the son of a streetcar operator and his personal fascination with railroads may have
played a part in his calculus of ensuring the continued operation of passenger rail service and
deterred him from blocking the salvage of the passenger rail network.147 While Nixon’s
sentiments are largely irrelevant in light of the larger policy debates over the act, they may be at
least indicative of a similar sentiment on the part of the American people. Polls from the time
indicated that while ridership of American passenger trains was near its nadir, there was still a
public preference for at least the existence of such service.148
Nationalization Continues: 3R, 4R and the Formation of Conrail
Despite the efforts of the federal government to salvage the national rail system, by the
mid 1970s American railroads were still in extremely poor health. Besides the cataclysmic fall of
the Penn Central in 1970, many other northeast roads succumbed to insolvency during
subsequent years. The Central Railroad of New Jersey had met an early demise due to its lack of
a longhaul freight route and assets which were subject to high taxes.149 Similarly, the Boston and
Maine Railroad was coerced into court in March of 1970 after defaulting on an interest
installment.150 However, the collapse of the Penn Central also triggered the fall of multiple other
railroads. The Lehigh Valley Railroad, which was highly dependent on the Penn Central
collapsed in mid1970, and the Pennsylvaniabased Reading Railroad followed in November of
1971, due largely to new environmental concerns surrounding the highsulphur coal which was a
key commodity for the railroad, which had lead to the precipitous decline in the shipping
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thereof. 151 The ErieLackawanna Railroad, which was one of the larger merged systems in the
northeast, was smothered by Hurricane Agnes in 1972 and left to ruination by its parent company
Dereco, which was in no financial to repair the massive damage to the railroad’s southern New
York mainline.152
In short, the northeast’s rail network was in an unprecedented state of disrepair. While
railroad mergers and prior bankruptcies had served to stem the problem off to an extent, the
imminent collapse of a key portion of the United States’ required further measures to mitigate
this impending disaster.153 Throughout the beginnings of the railroads’ respective falls, the
federal government in general, and the Interstate Commerce Commission specifically, failed to
provide an immediate response.154 However, as the possible liquidation of the Penn Central drew
nearer, the northeastern railroad system was in greater jeopardy than ever. Given that the
remaining competitor railroads were either in precarious financial conditions or completely
insolvent, there seemed little chance that a private entity would affect the salvage of the Penn
Central’s rights of way, and a nationalization scheme similar to that of Amtrak became an
increasingly tenable solution.155
Despite the apparent need for solutions other than that which were based in the private
sector, the concept of nationalization has nearly always run counter to the underlying ideologies
of the American people, and was often characterized as socialism.156 In the 1970’s, in the midst
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of the Cold War, the prospect of nationalization was an especially unpopular one, and not one
which the Nixon administration was eager to espouse.157 While the nationalization of passenger
service through Amtrak was certainly a move toward more nationalistic policy, the salvation of
the northeastern railroad situation represented something even more fundamental.158 The
movement of freight railroads into the purview of the federal government represented the near
elimination of all private railroad competition in the northeast. Despite the initial opposition to
such proposals by Congress and private businessmen, the need for a nationalized system became
was evident. Even the Nixon administration, continuously the proponent of private business,
supported the plan, however, it attempted to cover itself under the guise of maintaining a
staunchly capitalist front.159
The preliminary formation of Conrail came in the form of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act, better known as “3R,” which created the United States Railway Association
(USRA), nonprofit corporation charged with revitalizing the flagging railroads through the
infusion of federal loans. The act recognized the need for “rail service system in the region
adequate for the needs of the regional and national rail system,” and laid the groundwork for the
establishment of the Consolidated Rail Corporation for running the northeastern rail system.160
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (“4R”), which was enacted in
1976, was the offspring of 3R. Implementing the Final System Plan developed by the USRA, the
act consolidated the vast majority of the failing failing northeastern railroads into one
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nationalized system under the brand name of Conrail.161 The only modicum of private
competition which remained in the system was the comparatively small Delaware and Hudson
railroad, which was explicitly left out of Conrail to provide the illusion of competition.162
While the 4R Act also contained some deregulatory elements, they were relatively
weak. 163 In addition, their implementation was executed poorly.164 However, their enactment
fundamentally reshaped the landscape of the railroad industry and laid the groundwork for the
largescale deregulation of railroads in the Staggers Act.
Conclusions
The decade of the 1970s was not only pivotal in the history of the railroad industry and
transportation related policy, but it also constitutes a curious chapter in national politics in
general. Casting aside the minutia of the collapse of the industry itself and the various attempts
by public and private actors to maintain viability in the northeastern railroad network, the
essence of 1970s railroad policy is that of increasing nationalization. The situation which
surrounded the nationalization of the railroads is both predictable and surprising. The political
climate of the era surrounding the passage of the nationalization bills, particularly the
conservative leanings of the Nixon administration, was particularly unfavorable to such actions.
Yet, the path dependant federal policy on railroads, predicated on the underlying
conceptualization of railroads as a critical piece of national infrastructure, seems to have driven
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policymakers to continue the push to treat railroads as a public good, rather than simply another
private industry which could be allowed to fail.
The creation of Amtrak and Conrail were both unprecedented in the history of railroads
up to this point, excepting the wartime incidences, nevertheless, they represent a continuation of
the policy of maintaining strict control over the railroad industry. The changes to the regulatory
system affected by the federal government prior to the passage of the Staggers Act demonstrate a
reluctance on the part of federal actors to diverge from the course of considering railroads as a
public good which needed to be preserved and maintained in order to promote national health, a
fact which is evidenced through the language of the acts themselves, and particularly the Rail
Passenger Service Act.
The thrust of the Nixon administration in creating not one, but two, nationalized railroad
organizations is, however, rather surprising given the trajectory and legacy of his presidency.
While the Nixon administration has been characterized as somewhat of an enigma, especially
when it comes to transportation policy, Nixon’s advocation for the nationalization of the
railroads, albeit under a capitalistic guise, may be indicative of the pervasiveness of this
conceptualization of railroads, even at a time in which they were becoming increasingly
irrelevant. Furthermore, although the utilization of passenger railroads had declined
precipitously, there is also evidence that the general public also viewed railroads similarly as a
public good, and desired their continued use, even in the face of decreasing utilization.
In short, the 1970s presents an instance of a strong exogenous economic shock to the
railroad industry. Nevertheless, the nationalistic policies enacted during this time period are
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largely path dependant, continuing in the wake of earlier policies which regulated and controlled
railroads as a public good.
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Chapter 4
Forces of Deregulation:
The Presidency, Intercurrence and Agenda Setting
The saga of railroad deregulation in general, and the Staggers Act in particular, is one
which is inextricably intertwined with a larger impetus for deregulation of private industry, and
especially the transportation industry, across the board. As highlighted in the previous chapter,
throughout the mid1970s, the railroad industry experienced a multiplicity of financial challenges
and subsequent policy changes which would set the stage for the wholesale deregulation of the
industry. Deregulation of the railroad industry did not occur without corollaries or within a
vacuum, and therefore cannot be studied in such a manner. The following two chapters, which
constitute the core of this work, will attempt to highlight the major political forces behind the
railroad deregulatory movement with particular focus on the narratives and motives which drove
it. First, this chapter will focus on the role of the presidency in the deregulation initiative. It will
hone in particularly on the ways in which presidents from Nixon to Carter provided the impetus
for deregulation, with particular focus on the media framing of the rail freight deregulatory
movement.
This chapter is critically important to the study of railroad deregulation because it
provides insights into the most prominent and public of the deregulatory rhetoricthat which
emanated from the executive office. In addition, it provides a unique perspective on the push for
deregulation, as it illustrates the efficacy of presidential influence in the drive for policy change.
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Origins of Railroad Deregulation
While railroad regulation was most certainly part of a larger push for deregulation across
American industries, several aspects of railroad regulation set it apart from other initiatives for
less federal control in other industries. Primarily, railroads have been much more closely,
arguably inextricably, linked to federal control than any of the other industries which were
deregulated in the same period. From the very beginning of the railroad industry’s growth,
railroads were regulated as infrastructure that was critical to the national interest. As seen in the
previous chapter, railroads contributed critically to the development of the national regulatory
structure as a whole. Even as railroads lost pertinence on the national stage, the federal
government saw it fit to preserve the national passenger rail system through the creation of the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, which essentially once more nationalized
railroad service, if only for passenger service. Similarly, the creation of the Consolidated Rail
Corporation, or Conrail in 1976, demonstrated further nationalization efforts and a reluctance to
free railroads to the whims of the market. Trepidation to allow railroads a wide breadth of
selfdetermination has remained constant through American legislative history. As will be
demonstrated later in the chapter, the narrative of allowing to fail was not prevalent even in the
debates surrounding deregulation.
Second, the structure of the railroad network itself makes it distinctly different than other
modes of transportation which were deregulated. Because airlines and road freight transportation
operate almost solely on public infrastructure with flexible routing possibilities, the deregulatory
efforts resulted in broad changes to the ways in which both industries operated following passage
of the respective acts. However, railroads operated, and still operate, on primarily private
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rightsofway. Apart from a few select segments of trackage in the northeast which are held by
the federal government and a smattering of stateowned corridors nationwide, railroad own,
maintain and operate upon private routes. The implications of private ownership are that even
when the federal government did choose to deregulate, ease of market entry and exit was not
greatly modified. Given that much of railroad infrastructure was bestowed upon the railroads via
land grants in the first place, the federal government’s divestment from railroad routing is rather
surprising in comparison to that of other transportation industries, in which federal and state
governments largely retained control over the infrastructure itself. As a corollary, while the
deregulation of airlines, trucking companies and even banks implicitly entailed expansion into
new markets and increased competition, railroad deregulation implied decreased competition.
Without the watchful oversight of the federal government, railroads would be able to readily
abandon infrastructure which served unprofitable markets, effectively both decreasing
competition and eliminating large swaths of the national network.
Yet, despite the marked differences between railroads and other industries on the
deregulation docket, Congress readily took up the issue of railroad deregulation alongside that of
other industries. In the wake of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, the
socalled “4R Act,” which was considerably more oriented towards nationalization than
deregulation, the 96th Congress moved to consider the Rail Act of 1980, later renamed the
Harley O. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, commonly known as the Staggers Act, in the fall of 1979.
While Carter’s initiative must be accounted for as a major force in the push for deregulation,
underpinnings of deregulation came from the presidency of Richard Nixon.
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Nixon and Early Deregulatory Efforts
Ushering in the decade of the 1970s, the presidency of Richard Nixon was predicated
upon conservative, free market values. “Nixon’s victory was less of a vote for a program of for
himself personally than a vote against big government, taxes, inflation, welfare, riots, liberals,
and pornography and obscenity,” noted historian Melvin Small.165 With economic regulation as a
centerpiece of “big government” policy, Nixon administration support for deregulatory policy
would have been unsurprising. However, Nixon espoused nearly the opposite. Nixon’s August
15, 1971 address to the nation on economic policy, while focusing on cutting taxes, federal
funding and stabilization of the dollar, failed to even touch upon intent to decrease the regulatory
regime.166 In short, the Nixon presidency was one which, in fact, greatly enhanced the regulatory
regime. Scholar Andrew Downer Crane writes, “Nixon [presided] over the apogee of economic
regulation in American history,” overseeing the institution of “the most extreme peacetime
regulations since Jefferson embargoed foreign trade.”167 Far from from decreasing the programs
against which Nixon postured himself “welfare state programs and government regulatory
bodies, against which Nixon railed during the 1968 campaign, actually flourished on his
watch.”168
Despite Nixon’s proclivities for increased regulation, the precipitous decline of the Penn
Central spurred him on to consider other potential remedies. According to Nixon’s economists,
the economy was on the brink of collapse, and the failure of the Penn Central “just might bring it
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down.”169 Initially, Nixon began to consider an effort to shift regulatory power away from the
Interstate Commerce Commission and back into the hands of the industries themselves.
Nevertheless, unable to find support for his deregulatory measures among industry interest
groups or industry constituencies, Nixon turned his focus early away from deregulatory efforts to
more issues more salient to the political climate of the time.170
However, Nixon was unable to ignore completely the problems in the railroad industry.
In June of 1970 when the Penn Central Company officially entered court for bankruptcy
protection, Nixon, even before the official bankruptcy announcement, realized the critical nature
of the collapse of the system, stating that “the railroad must be saved.”171 
As outlined in the

previous chapter, the massive system, while the first in a slew of other northeastern railroads
which would similarly become insolvent, was critical to the infrastructure of the northeast, and
an interruption in service would entail a huge boost to unemployment figures as well as the
practical implications of the inability of factories to ship and receive products and components.
In this vein, Nixon initially approved federal loans that would keep the system
operating.172 However, given the precarious nature of the transportation industry at this juncture,
Nixon sought to address the problem on a more fundamental level than simply attempting
stopgap measures. The need for more fundamental reforms was echoed by Stuart Saunders,
chairman of the board of Penn Central, who stated that while the company had been impacted by
“recession, inflation, tight money and high interest rates,” the fundamental problems with the
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railroad lay in “problems which were unmanageable,” and not because of poor management on
the part of the company.173
Urging the current Secretary of Transportation John Volpe to study transportation issues
in a broader fashion, Nixon sought to pursue deregulating the transportation industry. While
Nixon believed that deregulation could gain traction through consumerism that would appear
“sexy” to the general public.174 However, this salience in the public mind for deregulation proved
to be more a figment of the president’s imagination than reality, and the administration failed to
garner support from consumer groups for deregulatory efforts. Therefore Nixon began to go
about coalitionbuilding efforts, seeking out industry leaders, shippers and unions beginning in
1971.175
In meeting with industry leaders, who were focused on continued mergers of railroad
companies as the solution to insolvency woes, Nixon urged them to back his deregulatory agenda
in order to spur action in Congress in disempowering the Interstate Commerce Commission
going so far as to call for its complete abolition altogether.176 Support from the industry, although
at first somewhat tepid, gathered enough speed to spur on the proposal of a bill, known as the
Transportation Regulatory Modernization Act of 1971.177 The act, supported by the Department
of Transportation, called for the loosening of the regulatory system, changing the employee work
rules of railroad companies, and increasing ability of railroads to have selfdetermination in the
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abandonment of rail corridors.178 However, the Nixon administration failed to back promote the
bill in Congress, and the initiative floundered, receiving minimal action through 1972.179 Despite
Nixon’s early aggressive stance on the need to salvage the railroad network through
deregulation, anecdotal evidence indicates that he was cowed by the power of the Teamsters,
who remained a powerful voice for the trucking industry.180 Furthermore, the distancing of the
Nixon administration from deregulatory efforts may have also been an indication that the
executive branch no longer perceived the collapse of the Penn Central to be as pressing an issue
as once supposed, at least from the perspective of political expediency.181 If anything, the sudden
stagnation of the administration of the Penn Central issue could be indicative of the lack of
salience of both the issues of deregulation and the collapse of the freight railroad industry to the
larger public.
Following the failure of the administration’s deregulatory efforts, Nixon largely shied
away from involvement in the freight railroad crisis. With the presidential election looming and
the industry moving closer to the brink of collapse, the Nixon administration’s solution to the
railroad crisis was to move away from deregulatory efforts and instead continue to allocate loans
to railroad companies, a move that was backed by shippers who also faced continued uncertainty
with the railroads in flux.182 The main thrust against deregulation in 1972 and 1973 was political.
The loss of a massive number of jobs which an unaided industry, or one which responded
unfavorably to deregulation, would have been catastrophic for the Nixon administration.
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If the Nixon administration did little to actually forward deregulatory transportation
policy, it did succeed in bringing the Interstate Commerce Commission under closer control of
the president. securing the nomination of the head of the Interstate Commerce Commission as a
presidential prerogative, paving the way for later administrations to hold greater sway in the
commission’s business and paving the way for later deregulatory efforts.183 In the words of
Nixon himself, actions such as bringing the chair of the ICC under presidential purview was
necessary to his strategy of “bringing power to the White House in order to dish it out.”184 While
Nixon himself may not have affected deregulatory policy, he at least brought it into the public
conversation. As Rose et al. state, “although Nixon ultimately failed to support his own
deregulation proposals, he at least helped move the idea of deregulation into the realm of the
thinkable...into the mainstream of American politics.”185
Ford and Deregulation
Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, pushed for the same deregulatory initiatives as his
predecessor. Yet, unlike Nixon, much of his policymaking efforts were relatively effective. His
proclivity for deregulatory policy took shape early in his presidential career, as he exploited
antigovernment sentiment which was prevalent following Watergate.186 Although Ford is rarely
remembered for his deregulatory efforts, he made deregulation one of the core tenets of his
administration, he “capitalized on it, to his credit, and made it his plank.”187 In a speech before
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the National Federation of Independant Business, Ford called for the freeing of “the business
community from regulatory bondage so that it can produce,” and he followed through on his
proclamation by initiating studies of the regulatory regime.188 Largely, however, the Ford
administration’s push for regulatory reform came as a result of the problems of inflation which
plagued the nation during his administration.189
Ford initiated the formation of the Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory
Reform (DCRG) in 1974, a task force charged with studying potential deregulatory measures.190
The DCRG’s priorities were underdeveloped, and while Ford continued to use deregulatory
rhetoric, the review group’s progress was sluggish at best. 191 Nevertheless, the Ford
administration brought the concept of deregulation closer to the public consciousness, especially
in the area of transportation. In his 1975 State of the Union speech, Ford emphasized the need for
transportation regulatory reform, stating, “Now we badly need reforms in other areas in our
economy: the airlines, trucking, railroads and financial institutions. I have submitted concrete
plans in each of these areas, not to help this or that industry, but to foster competition and bring
down prices for the consumer.”192
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act was submitted by Ford to
Congress in 1975, and, as discussed previously, represented the first effort to deregulate the
freight railroad industry.193 Although deregulation under the bill was modest at best, it
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represented a first step in the progress of regulatory reform. Perhaps even more importantly, Ford
initiative in forwarding deregulatory policies was critical in forming an organized coalition
dedicated to regulatory reform.194
Deregulation and the Carter Administration
While Carter’s administration was a distinctly liberal one, the president sought a
transition away from the earlier presidencies of Gerald Ford and Richard Nixon. The Ford and
Nixon Administrations, both of which were marked by what has been termed “imperial”
presidential policy, used the office of the president to hand down decisions which were often
structured by federal solutions, while Carter sought to steer the administration in a distinctly
more populist direction.195 At the outset of his presidency, Carter indicated his intent to diverge
from the attitudes of previous presidents by keeping inauguration ceremonies to a minimum and
presenting an overall modest appearance to the presidency.196
Carter’s distinct approach to the presidency was largely influenced by his upbringing, a
background was unlike those of many previous presidents. Raised in a southern home of modest
means, Carter was deeply religious and predicated much of his policy on his valuebased belief
system.197 As such, he diverged considerably from typical Democratic politics, and built the
narrative of his presidency upon the worthiness of the American people and the shortcomings of
government.198 His relationship with Congress, although he tended to avoid compromise and
often held himself aloof from policy debates, was one which was characterized largely by
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success on the part of the president's’ policies. However as the president’s term in office
progressed, his relationship with Congress became progressively more strained.199 Although
many of Carter’s later initiatives were blocked by Congress, Carter successfully passed railroad
deregulation with a largely sympathetic Congress behind him.200
At the outset of his administration, President Jimmy Carter announced that a main thrust
of his administration would be cutting “red tape” in government through the deregulation of
certain private industries which were, at the time, heavily regulated by the federal government.
In his 1978 State of the Union address, Carter called for the reduction of government regulation
“that drives up costs and drives up prices.”201 Carter echoed calls for further deregulation in his
1979 address, indicating his intent to deregulate surface transportation, including rail, bus and
trucking transportation.202
Carter first targeted the airline industry for deregulation.203 Having experienced growth
throughout most of the 1950s and 60s largely due to rapid advances in airline technology, air
carriers were the first target of deregulatory policy due to the growing difficulties for airlines to
serve effectively new markets and for new airlines to compete effectively with existing ones. The
regulation of airlines had extended back to the 1920s, and the federal Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) was responsible controlling entry into markets, instituting passenger fare controls and
stipulating airline routes.204 While the push for the deregulation of airlines extended back to
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previous administrations such as that of Nixon, the abolition of federal regulation of airlines was
accomplished under the Carter administration, largely helped by the appointment of
deregulationfriendly regulators to the CAB.205 A bellwether for the deregulation of other
industries which would follow, the returning of airlines to more marketbased controls
eliminated some of the more exorbitant aspects of airline travel, such as high fares, the wide
availability of accommodations and high salaries for airline pilots, but ultimately freed the
industry to expand into other markets and stimulate increased competition in existing ones.206
The deregulation of other industries followed suit. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, also
spurred by initiatives which reached back to the Kennedy and Nixon administrations,
deregulated the trucking industry to a large extent, removing similar price controls and entry
barriers to trucking companies, resulting in the proliferation of road surface transportation
companies following its passage. 207 Similarly, the Carter administration oversaw the initiation of
deregulation of telecommunications, and similarly pushed for the deregulation of the banking
industry which allowed for the easier entry of banks into markets.208 Naming it the “capstone” of
his drive for deregulation, Carter pushed for the passage of the Staggers Rail Act through
Congress, stating that it effectively abolished “needless and burdensome Federal regulations
which harm all of us. This effort is crucial to promote more competition, to improve productivity
and to hold down inflation.”209
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Although Carter’s legacy as a proponent of marketbased solutions for private industries
has been somewhat ignored in comparison to his successor Ronald Reagan, the Carter
administration’s impetus given to and proclivity for deregulatory practices cannot be overlooked
when it comes to the analysis of the changes in the railroad industry in the 1970s. Carter
provided a majority of the impetus for deregulation through his aggressive use of appointments
to regulatory boards and his invocation of American ideals in his public appeals for deregulatory
policy.
Conclusion
Carter’s influence on the state of affairs in the regulatory scheme demonstrates both the
powerful position which the presidency holds over the direction of federal regulatory policy as
well as the tenuous nature of path dependence to explain the direction of federal policy. While
earlier presidencies, particularly that of Nixon and Ford, made some attempt at regulatory
change, their efforts were largely muted by the continuance of trajectory toward regulating
railroads in the public interest. However, the Carter administration's wholehearted espousal of
deregulatory policy is largely accountable for the change in policy which we see in the
deregulation of the railroad industry through the Staggers Act.
The change from nationalization to deregulation and a divergence from path dependency
can be described by the theory of intercurrence, as proposed by Orren and Skowronek. The force
of the executive office on the trajectory of railroad regulation can be described as an institutional
clash and “reciprocal interactions,” which contributed to the decisive policy change.210
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Chapter 5
Consideration and Passage of the Staggers Rail Act:
Congressional Calculus and Temporal Comparisons

The signing of the Harley O. Staggers Rail Act into law on October 14, 1980 marked a
seminal and pivotal point in the history of the American regulatory system. Deregulating the
railroad system to a massive extent, the act was not only part of a larger flow of deregulatory
legislation, but the railroad system was governed by the first and most comprehensive set of
regulations, and thus marked one of the most fundamental regulatory policy shifts in American
history. This act composes the central analysis of this work, and therefore a considerable portion
of this chapter will be dedicated to characterizing the nature of the bill itself and the
Congressional deliberations related to its passage.
This chapter will first provide an overview of the details of the legislation itself and its
progress through Congress, and will move to a closer analysis of the debates themselves,
providing selections from the arguments of the Congressional actors. This analysis will be
compared to the the debates over earlier, related legislation in order to illustrate the variations on
narrative which occurred among the considerations of the respective acts.
Outline of Staggers Act Provisions
The provisions of the Staggers Act focused primarily on the ratemaking abilities of
railroad companies. Fundamentally, it removed the requirement that similar routes on different
railroads had to be priced in a similar fashion.211 This allowed railroads to compete more
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effectively with one another and maximize the efficiency of their route usage. Furthermore, it
allowed railroads to enter into private and confidential contracts with shippers.212 The ability of
railroads to abandoned trackage and particularly sell corridors to the proliferating Class III
railroads was also enhanced, giving railroads more freedom to liquidate assets which were a
burden to the financial wellbeing of the respective companies.213 While rate regulation was still
possible in the case of insufficient competition from other railroad companies, the act broadened
the definition of competition to encompass other viable alternate modes of transportation, such as
trucking. However, what perhaps differentiated the Staggers Act from earlier regulatory acts was
the explicit acknowledgement by Congress that revenuemaking was a paramount necessity for
the industry.214
The express purpose of the act, according to its text, was to “provide for the restoration,
use, maintenance and improvement of the physical facilities and financial stability of the rail
system of the United States.”215 The act itself laid out several means by which it sought to
accomplish these ends. First, by assisting the “railroads of the Nation in rehabilitating the rail
system in order to meet the demands of interstate commerce and the national defense;” second,
by reforming “Federal regulatory policy so as to preserve a safe, adequate, economical, efficient
and financially stable rail system;” third by assisting “the rail system to remain viable in the
private sector of the economy;” fourth, providing “a regulatory process that balances the needs of
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carriers, shippers and the public;” and finally, assisting in “the rehabilitation and financing of the
rail system.”216
While a cursory glance at the goals of these provisions, in light of former regulatory
legislation, might not seem to be considerably different than its predecessor acts, a closer
analysis reveals that the underlying attitudes of federal actors was considerably different from
that of former acts. While it is clear from these stated purposes that Congress viewed the railroad
system as vital to the national transportation network, it is also clear that the railroads in the bill
were considered to be valued as private entities which possessed the prerogative of accruing
monetary gains and profits. This lies at the heart of the differentiation between this and earlier
legislation, which will be brought to greater light in the following sections.
Consideration and Passage of the Staggers Act
Sponsored by Senator Howard Cannon (DWV) and with bipartisan cosponsorship from
Senators Bob Packwood (ROR) and Russell Long (DLA), S. 1946 was introduced into the
Senate on October 29, 1979.217 After being considered by the Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation on December 7, 1979, the bill moved to consideration by the Senate.
The opposition to the bill in the Senate revolved primarily around the rates and
abandonment provisions of the bill, which afforded to railroads greater flexibility ratesetting and
in choosing to discontinue service on select lines. Lead by Milton Young (RND) and Bob Dole
(RKS), a group of senators, particularly from rural states, argued against the bill based on its
potential effects on rural upper Midwestern states, from which the price of the transportation of
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critical products such as wheat, was already high.218 Citing railroads’ ability to make greater
determinations in these rates, especially in the face of the rising price of diesel fuel, the
opposition argued that ratemaking deregulation would be detrimental to markets in those states,
and especially for smaller manufacturers. Similar concerns were voiced by William Cohen
(RME), who argued that rate changes could have a detrimental effect on the poultry market,
especially in rural New England.219
A second major concern of opponents in the Senate centered on the potential
abandonments which would come as a result of a deregulated rail network. Primary to this
consideration was the Illinois Central Gulf, the company which had resulted from the merger of
Illinios Central and Gulf, Mobile and Ohio railways.220 While the ICC had blocked the proposed
abandonment of the old GM&O main line through Mississippi, under the deregulated system,
abandonment of such corridors would be imminent. Thad Cochran (RMS) argued that
abandonment, if left to the hands of the railroads, would result in a major loss of national
infrastructure, especially due to the “domino effect” which would occur if railroads began
eliminating trackage which rendered connecting corridors from other railroads irrelevant.221 The
Cochran Amendment (UP No. 1030) would have amended the bill so as to make abandonment
more difficult, thereby arguably protecting communities from loss of rail service. Introduced on
April 1, 1980, the Cochran Amendment was nevertheless defeated 3759.222
Proponents of the bill in the Senate focused their arguments on the dilapidated state of
railroad infrastructure at the time, and the necessity of a profitable railroad industry to ensure
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continued operation. Specifically, supporters of deregulation argued that not only was
profitability a necessity for the survival of the railroad companies, but their continued operation
was necessary to handle the increase in coal transportation. They argued that the domestic
production and transportation of coal was integral to combating the necessity of importing more
foreign oil, and that doing so required a strong national railroad infrastructure fueled by
competitive rates and not the proposed coal slurry pipelines which would require hefty amounts
of water which was necessary to the droughtstricken western states.223
Despite the controversy over several of the provisions of the act, in a nearly unanimous
final vote of 91 to 4, S. 1946 was passed in the Senate as the Railroad Transportation Policy Act
of 1980 on April 1, 1980.224
The debates over the act in the House were more extensive and controversial than those
of the House. Primary considerations of the bill encompassed mainly its ratemaking provisions.
Opposition to some of the ratemaking stipulations came in the form of the controversial Murphy
and Eckert Amendments, which, if passed, would have allowed the ICC to retain much of its
regulatory power over rates. 225 These amendments represented attempts by representatives, such
as Congressman Nick Rahall (DWV), of largely rural states which were heavily reliant on
agriculture and mining, and expressed reservations concerning the fairness of railroad rates in
shipping if the carriers were allowed a wide latitude of determination. Given the reregulatory
nature of such amendments, there was considerable opposition from much of the House toward
them, and the ratemaking limitations were defeated. 226
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The bill was passed in the House on September 9, 1980 as the Railroad Transportation
Policy Act of 1980 instead of the similar House bill, H.R. 7235, which contained nearly the same
provisions.227 Throughout September of 1980 the bill was reconciled, and finally passed again in
the House on September 30, 1980.228
Analysis of Congressional Debates
In order to analyze the nature of the calculus of Congressional actors on railroad
deregulation, this chapter will examine the key deliberations surrounding the passage of the
Staggers Act. Specifically, this chapter will delve deeply into the essence of the debates,
attempting to probe the underlying motivations and considerations of the legislative actors
involved. While the entirety of the extensive Congressional debates can in no way be completely
summarized within a single chapter, this work will seek to highlight the primary elements of the
those debates. In order to provide more illumination to the changes in Congressional calculus
which characterized the Staggers Act, the debates will also be contrasted with the Congressional
deliberations concerning the creation of Amtrak and Conrail and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, specifically considering the passage of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, the
Railroad Reorganization and Regulatory Reform Act and the Interstate Commerce Act.
In light of the provisions of the bill itself, analysis of the Congressional debates revealed
three key elements which were common to arguments in favor of passage. These elements can be
categorized as 1) a focus on changing policy in favor of the industry and its need to accrue
revenues, 2) the need to maintain the national rail infrastructure, but in a way which was done by
the industry itself and not through the regulatory regime, and 3) a need for the reestablishment of
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market principles for competition between modes of transportation. These elements were not
only key to the debates, but are indicative of a marked shift in the ways in which Congress
considered the railroad system as a whole and its relationship to the state. While earlier debates,
including those concerning the Interstate Commerce Act, 3R and 4R shared many of the same
elements as those of the Staggers Act, these three areas encompass the key areas of change.
I.
Industry Orientation, Consumer Protections and the National Interest

During the congressional debates, a main thrust of the calculus in both the House and the
Senate was the protection of the railroad industry itself.229 This presented a marked shift from the
ways in which Congress considered railroads in the deliberation on the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887, and even from the consideration of the Rail Passenger Service Act and, to some extent,
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. Close consideration of the
language of the debates demonstrates that Congress’ attitude towards railroads was largely
sympathetic.
The treatment of railroads by the majority of congressional representatives is especially
evident in the debates surrounding the Murphy and Eckert Amendments. The amendment, which
failed passage, would have limited many of the ratemaking provisions of the Staggers Act by
requiring rates to be uniform between cities, and was based on the rationale that the
consolidation of railroads made open competition between railroads an ineffective means of
maintaining equitable rates due to the disparate nature of corridors between cities.230 Opposition
to this amendment was strong, and arguments against the amendment were focused on the ability
of the amendment to cripple the act to the point to which deregulation would be all but null.231
229
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A major element of regulation under the ICC prior to the passage of the Staggers Act was
portrate equalization, which standardized rates between destinations, regardless of the routing of
the shipment and the port utilized, and a major thrust of the Eckert Amendment was to preserve
this prerogative.232 Representative John Murphy (DNY) expressed the view of the proponents of
the bill relative to the debate over the continuation of portrate equalization espoused in the
Eckert Amendment by stating, “Port rate equalization has other undesirable consequences as
well. For example, it inhibits railroad from making efficient market adjustments based on costs
and competitive conditions. Carrier costs and market forces should determine rate relationships,
between common origins and competitive ports, rather than relying on a policy of rate
equalizationa policy which is void of either legal justification or economic merit.”233 Concern
for the wellbeing of railroads themselves was also evident from his remarks, as he stated, “In
fact, many others would be adversely affected, including the very railroads and railway workers
whom we are helping with this deregulation legislation today. As Mr. Florio, Mr. Madigan and
the other members of the Transportation and Commerce Subcommittee have already pointed out
to this committee, the regulatory system is in large part responsible for the poor financial
condition of the railroad industry today.”234
Concern for the wellbeing of the railroad industry itself was pervasive throughout the
debates, especially the need for the railroads to once again become financially solvent.
Congressman Dan Glickman (DKS) stated “from my work in this area, it has become
abundantly evident that the railroads need additional revenues if they are to be able to get their
backlog of maintenance taken care of. Industry estimates indicate that those repairs will cost in
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the range of $4 billion. Other estimates run as high as $10 billion or even higher. Clearly that
will take more money.”235 In addressing the intent of the bill to enhance intermodalism, or
mixedmode coordinated transportation, Congressman Allen Ertel (DPA) stated that the bill
would improve conditions for railroads because, “intermodalism will be good for the railroads
themselves by reducing the amount of empty car mileage. A reduction of just 10 percent of
empty car mileage reduces the total rail operating costs by 4 percent.”236
Arguments for the passage of the act also focused on the ways in which the transportation
industry at large had changed so that the railroad industry was no longer able to compete
effectively with other modes of transportation. Congressman James Florio (DNJ) stated “the
problems with the rail industry are extensive...Overregulation has, in fact, contributed to the
inability of the railroad to attract traffic back and to enable it to compete for traffic back and to
enable it to compete for traffic from other modes of transportation.”237
In addition, Congress focused on maintaining the health of the industry through
deregulation. Congressman Edward Madigan (RIL) argued for the bill on the basis of its
mitigation of the infection which was spreading throughout the industry. He stated “The railroad
industry as a whole earns a rate of return of 2.7 percent, those that are making money. In my part
of the country, they are not making money any more. The two bankruptcies we are we are
handling this year cause us in each case to be putting more tax dollars into the system. Both have
been midwestern railroads. Somebody might think that they can keep this railroad problem
confined to the Northeast and to the Midwest. I assure you, you cannot. Either we solve the
problems of the railroad industry with this bill or this problem spreads on to the West and
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Southwest as well.” 238 Attitudes such as this were relatively pervasive throughout Congress, and
are indicative of the urgency which was felt by many members of Congress in addressing the
problem of railroad insolvency. Barber Conable (RNY) related the issue specifically to the issue
of Conrail’s insolvency. “There are a flock of reasons,” he stated “for this rather dismal
performance, but the most pervasive of these seems to be the problem of governmental
regulation of a sort that has turned topsyturvy the normal incentives that drive businesses
forward into innovative channels and some portion of this problem can be corrected through
changes in tax policy of the kind being considered by the Ways and Means Committee...In the
meantime, however, we can do something about the railroads by approving the bill now before
us...One cannot say what the passage of this legislation will specifically do for Conrail, on which
my area of New York must depend for freight services. It will probably not put it back on the
track toward profitabilityonly an early end to the Carter recession could do that. But
deregulation could give Conrail, and our other struggling railroadssome badly needed breathing
room and a new spark of life that might serve to postpone the day when other, more costly kinds
of Federal relief could be needed.”239 Other members of the house, including Congressman
Madigan concurred, stating, “Several major major railroads serve the State of Texas. Two of
those railroads oppose the rail bill, in part because they can see that other railroads will soon be
out of business under the present regulatory system. That, Mr. Speaker, is the concern all of us
must have in considering the [Staggers] Rail Act of 1980. It is not a ‘ConRail relief bill.’
ConRail will be a problem whether or not this bill is passed. It is a bill that can prevent
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duplication of the ConRail problem in the West, the Midwest, the South, and even in the State of
Texas.” 240
Congress was also concerned with the health of Class III, or “shortline,” carriers in its
calculus on the bill. This push for equity to shortline railroads was largely sparked by the
impetus of the American Shortline Railroad Association, who worked closely Senator Staggers
and others to develop legislation which would insulate shortline railroads to some extent from
the whims of the larger companies.241 The Broyhill Amendment, which was successfully
amended to the act, sought a modicum of statelevel regulation which afforded intrastate Class
III railroads protection as part of the larger rail network. 242 In arguing for the passage of the
amendment, Congressman David Emory (RME), echoed the sentiments of the amendment,
arguing that, “the vital importance of all shortline carriers, whether listed as class III or class II
[regional], should be understood by all concerned with a healthy railroad industry. Failure to
protect all of these railroads will be a serious flaw in this issue of deregulation.” 243
As concerned as Congress was with the wellbeing of the railroad industry, protection of
the consumer was largely devoid from the deliberations, and where it was present, it was
typically intertwined with the need for the wellbeing of the railroads themselves. The
consideration of consumers was most apparent in the consideration of the abolition of portrate
equalization, concerning which Congressman Michael Meyers (DPA) argued, “[The Eckert
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Amendment] would only serve to reduce competition among ports. The real losers would be
consumers and shippers.” 244 Congressman Thomas B. Evans, Jr. (RDE), matched this
characterization of the amendment, call it “nothing more than an attempt to have the consumers
of America pay subsidies in than an attempt to have the consumers of America pay subsidies in
the form of higher prices to big ports such as New York City...The purpose of the bill before us,
as I understand it, and I think everyone in this body does, is to reduce excessive regulations in
the railroad industry. This amendment moves in the opposite direction.” 245 Despite the modicum
of concern for consumers and railroad rate setting which manifested itself in the Eckert
Amendment debate, the Congressional record is largely devoid of consideration of consumer
well being under a deregulated rail industry.
II.
National Infrastructure
Inherent in the debate was a discussion of the necessity to maintain the national rail
infrastructure due to its essential nature to international competition and domestic productivity.
However, the consideration of national infrastructure took place largely within the context of free
market maintenance of that infrastructure, as well as the necessity of the infrastructure for a
healthy railroad industry, rather than for the public good. Presenting evidence in favor of the
Ertel Amendment, a modification of the act which sought to encourage intermodal transportation
by exempting railroads of any rate regulation where multiple modes of transportation were
involved, the amendment’s sponsor, Allen Ertel argued, “Railroads, trucking companies, airlines
and barge companies wishing to cooperate with one another are often faced with a new set of
regulations. In many cases, the cost of compliance is simply too high. By explicitly giving the
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ICC the authority to eliminate some of this redtape, my amendment is the first step toward a
coherent national transportation system.”246 Congressman Harley O. Staggers, for whom the bill
was named, also lauded its potential impact on the national rail network, while contextualizing
the desire for a healthy system with the wellbeing of the industry itself. He stated, “I have
traveled in practically every country that has railroads. Ours is a system that is less than healthy,
right here in America; even in China they have far better railroads than we have. So I don not
understand why we do not try to pass a bill that will see that the railroads are healthy.”247
The railroad’s role as part of the larger national infrastructure was also contextualized by
the declining state of the railroad’s assets. Congressman Glickman called for the improvement of
the national rail network through ensuring that the railroads earned sufficient revenues. “During
the decade of the seventies,” he remarked, “rail accidents due to bad tracks and railbeds cost
over $500 million, and it has been estimated that derailments and collisions took place last year
at a rate of about one every hour...From my work in this area, it has become abundantly clear that
the railroads need additional revenues if they are going to get their backlog of maintenance taken
care of.” 248 Congressman Rahall, speaking on the subject of the shipping of critical materials,
stated, “Regulatory reform, as most speakers this afternoon have agreed, is really needed to
improve the conditions and services of our Nation’s railroad system. The financial health of
many railroads and the upgrading of railroad transportation services available to shippers and the
public is, indeed, a needed service in this country.”249
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III. Market Forces
“The major thrust of this legislation is to get away from regulation to a large extent and to
let the marketplace forces determine the allocation of resources, capital and marketing
decisions,” argued Congressman Madigan on April 1, 1980.250 A third major element of the
debate was the need for competition and market forces, and not the federal regulatory regime, to
determine pricing. This largely was rationalized as a result of the increased competition from
other modes of transportation, which rendered the railroads a significantly less monopolistic
enterprise. Arguing against the provisions of the Eckert Amendment, Congressman Florio stated,
“This whole approach [of the Eckert Amendment] is in opposition to the approach of this bill,
which is to say that market conditions should determine what the rates are.”251 Congressman
Florio later continued by remarking, “I think it is clear that what we have here is a balance, that
certainly the railroads are very much in favor of increased flexibility to allow them to make
marketing decisions free from governmental restraint or freer from governmental restraint...there
is a legitimate position that the [Eckert] amendment will result in even more regulation than we
have now.”252 Congressman Madigan echoed these sentiments, arguing, “Where there is that
competition, the marketplace, rather than Congress, should be used to determine the price
level.”253
Early Debates: Change in Focus
In order to illustrate sharply the change in narrative which differentiates the calculus of
earlier nationalization efforts from the push for deregulation in the Staggers Act, it is illustrative
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to provide a similar analysis as was presented above for those earlier acts. Specifically, the
following sections will take a close survey of the debates surrounding the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act (3R) of 1973 and the
Railroad Reorganization and Revitalization Act (4R) of 1976.
I. Industry Orientation, Consumer Protections and the National Interest
In contrast to the industryoriented narrative which was pervasive in the debates on the
Staggers Act, Congress, in considering the Interstate Commerce Act, took a much different
approach to how it conceptualized the interaction between railroads, shippers and even the
common individual. The record of the bill’s consideration is riddled with adjectives such as
“unjust,” “oppression,” “demands,” and “pressures.” Arguing against the bill, Senator George
Frisbie Hoar made a scathing indictment of the conception of railroad companies’ oppression of
the common man through their unfair pricing mechanisms. He stated, “There is not an hour of
the day’s life of a Massachusetts workingman in which he does not feel the pressure of the unjust
demands of the railroad when those unjust demands exist anywhere. There is not an article of his
necessity or of his luxury into the cost of which the price of transportation over the continent
does not enter. There is not a product of his skill, there is not an ambition of his life, whether for
wealth, for honor, or for usefulness, which is not affected by the railroad and upon which it does
not press as a burden when it is permitted to make an unjust charge.” 254
Despite the opposition of some members of Congress, such as Senator Hoar, the idea of
railroadasoppressor was a relatively common one. Hoar’s comments were specifically directed
at the conference report on the bill, which identified railroads as a largely oppressive and
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adversarial force to consumers. A focus on the protection of consumers was pervasive
throughout the debates, and was paramount to the consideration of the Interstate Commerce Act.
However, this narrative largely changed during the debates over the Rail Passenger
Service Act. While the explicit emphasis on the railroads’ need to remain solvent was not
present, Congress still acknowledged the need for railroads to be relieved of their passenger
service burdens. Congressman William Springer (DIL) emphasized the responsibility of Amtrak
to the financial relief of freight railroads in stating that “Amtrak was created to take up the
burden of providing passenger service on the rail lines and relieve the carriers of a crushing
economic loss which threatened the continued existence of all rail service.”255 The framing of the
issue, as embodied in this quote and in the debates at large, was that rail service needed to be
maintained, despite the industry itself. In the consideration of the the 3R act, this narrative was
present as well. Congressman Hudnut (RIN) posited, concerning the creation of Conrail, “While
I am under no illusion that the current legislation, as embodied in H.R. 9142, will be a complete
solution to the problems experienced by the railroad industry in the United States, it will
maintain essential services in an important region of the nation. It is in the public interest that
this bill be adopted to meet the urgent needs which prompted its consideration.” 256 This
conceptualization of the railroad network, as an industry which serves the “public interest,”
harkens back to the structure of the nature of the debates over the Interstate Commerce Act.
While some concern for the industry's wellbeing is evident, the majority of the concern in the
debates lay in the maintenance of the rail system in serving the national good.
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II. National Infrastructure
While the issue of national infrastructure was not as explicitly stated in the Interstate
Commerce Act debates, the concept of railroads as the backbone of national infrastructure was
latent in the narrative, both in the bill and in the Congressional deliberations. Scholar Stephen
Dempsey notes that the intent of the Interstate Commerce Act was to maintain the national
infrastructure, and the continuation of regulation thereof was an outgrowth of the desire to utilize
the national rail network as a means for stabilizing the national economy.257
In the subsequent debates over the Rail Passenger Service Act, the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act and the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, there is a
continuation of the narrative concerning the integral nature of the railroad system to the national
infrastructure. The text of the 3R Act itself describes that the law is in pursuit of maintaining
“essential rail service in the northeast and midwest” which was provided by “railroads which are
today insolvent and attempting to undergo reorganization.”258 Likewise, the Passenger Rail
Service Act echoed similar sentiments, stating at the outset of the bill that “the Congress finds
that modern, efficient, intercity railroad passenger service is a necessary part of a balanced
transportation system; that the public convenience and necessity require the continuance and
improvement of such service between crowded urban areas and in other areas of the country.”259
This was reflected in the floor statements concerning the passage of the 3R Act, during which
Congresswoman Holt (RMD) stated that “the continued operation of the Northeast rail system
is of vital importance to the nation both economically and environmentally. This transportation
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network must be preserved and strengthened in a manner that benefits rail creditors, rail
employees and the general public.”260
III. Market Forces
The enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act was predicated on the very fact that the
market had failed in the maintenance of just and fair pricing. As the regulatory regime had
developed, there had been a continued infatuation with the financial health of the industry as
controlled via hefty regulation.261 While the consideration of market forces were not extremely
prominent in the debates around the Rail Passenger Service Act, 3R and 4R, there was
acknowledgement that the current market conditions were not favorable to railroad profitability,
and therefore government takeover of the industries was necessary. Congressman Robert Tiernan
acknowledged that while government takeover of the railroads was not a desirable longterm
outcome, the takeover was necessary to maintain the national rail system.262
Absent from the debates over these three acts was the possibility of leaving the railroad
network to the whims of the market. Senator Vance Hartke (DIN) expressed the views of the
chamber and the intent of the act when he stated that the passenger rail network was better
operated as a unified public organization than a fragmented, competitive, private one.263 This
type of calculus is distinctly divergent from that of the Staggers Act passage, which focused
completely on market principles for the efficient operation of the rail network.
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Conclusion
The differences in the attitude of federal legislators concerning the Staggers Act from
those on earlier regulatory bills, particularly the Interstate Commerce Act, the Passenger Rail
Service Act, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act and the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act are clear from a close examination of the debates themselves. Primarily,
the differentiation lies in attitudes concerning the perceived oppression of the railroad industry
upon consumers as opposed to an interest in the wellbeing of the railroad industry itself, a
necessity to maintain the national railroad infrastructure and the use of market forces to maintain
both. Specifically, earlier legislation which focused on increasing regulation considered railroads
to be an integral, even primary piece of the national transportation infrastructure, while later bills
treated railroads as simply a piece of the larger network. Furthermore, because of the singular
and hegemonic nature of the railroad system, earlier legislators considered railroad rates to be
integrally connected to the wellbeing of consumers, who had no choice but to rely on the
railroads for transportation and delivery of goods. Later legislation, and particularly the Staggers
Act, considered the ability of railroads to obtain sufficient revenue to be paramount, more so
than the perceived equity of shipping rates. Finally, because of the nature of the relation between
railroads and other forms of transportation, later legislation, and in particular Staggers Act, relied
heavily on market forces to maintain effective competition and equitable rates, whereas earlier
legislation relied on the regulatory regime in order to achieve the same ends.
The changing nature of the debates is illustrative primarily of the changing relationship
between railroads and the general public. As highlighted in previous chapters, the railroads
salience to public life was greatly magnified in the late 19th Century in comparison to the 1970s,
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at which point railroads had largely faded from the public’s collective conscience. Furthermore,
the efforts of the federal government in promoting alternative forms of transportation aided in
this respect. Therefore, shifts in the nature of the debate are reflective not only of changing
mindsets, but also of changing federal policies. Analysis of the nature of the debates and the
attitudes of federal actors is paramount in this work as it illustrates the swift and decisive change
which was brought about by the Staggers Act as a result of the changing nature of the interaction
between railroads, national wellbeing and public life. The change in the focus of the debates is
best described as the result of intercurrencethe interaction of other institutions, particularly the
presidency, on the Congressional calculus can be charged for the divergence of rhetoric.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion:
Toward a Rationalization of Regulatory Change
The 1970s present an intriguing and confusing era in both the history of railroads and the
development of regulatory policy. The turbulence of the era is evidenced by the collapse of the
northeastern freight railroad industry, the precipitous decline of passenger rail ridership and the
frantic merging of railroad corporations to attempt to stave off the effects of the industry’s
decline. While the study of the collapse of the freight railroad industry presents an interesting
investigation both as a study of the economics of freight and passenger railroading as well as the
history of the railroad as an American institution, the study of the public policy response
arguably presents an even more revelatory and fascinating facet of this turbulent period.
The study presented here is not unique in its interest in this era. Multiple histories of the
American railroad system in this period have been penned, and studies of the economic
ramifications of both the collapse of the industry and regulatory changes are proliferous.
However, political scientists have been loathe to investigate this era. The muddied and bifurcated
nature of the regulatory changes of this era make the investigation of their significance as the
outworkings of political institutions rather difficult.
The saga which was related in the previous chapters seems to leave the reader with
almost as many questions as answers. Why did railroad deregulation occur at the time at which it
did? Why was a Democratic president responsible for providing the impetus for dismantling the
railroad regulatory scheme, while a Republican executed the largest permanent railroad
nationalization effort in American history? Why did deregulation and nationalization occur in
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such close temporal proximity to one another? Why did the federal government diverge from its
path of regulating railroads as a public good, and thereby use the regulatory scheme to even the
competition?
It was these questions which first intrigued the author of this work and which this paper
set out to explore. However, in the enigma that is United States politics, the answers to such
questions are not always clear. Yet, throughout this work political science academic literature
has been brought to bear on the analyses of the railroad deregulation phenomena, and this
chapter will seek to synthesize that information in order to provide the reader with relevant
conclusions surrounding the nature of the deregulatory movement.
The previous chapters attempted to lay out a comprehensive overview of four major
elements of the regulatory changes of the 1970s, namely, the formulation of policy and the
regulation of railroads as a public good, the precipitation of nationalization policy through the
economic collapse of the northeastern railroad industry, the force of the executive in agenda
setting and developing deregulatory policy, and finally the nature of the Congressional debates in
light of the changing narrative regarding railroads in the public sphere. More specifically, this
research found that the Staggers Act debates centered around public policy (or the lack thereof)
as a means to maintain the health of the industry, rather than to regulate railroads as a public
good. This conceptualization stands in opposition to earlier acts, including the Rail Passenger
Service Act and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, as well as the Interstate Commerce Act,
which stipulated, both through their provisions and their respective Congressional consideration,
that the railroad needed to be kept in check through federal control in order to ensure its efficient
service to the nation and the protection of the citizenry from its potential tyranny.
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As outlined in Chapter 3, the state of the railroad industry at the time of the passage of
the Staggers Act was extremely dire, and the railroads themselves had fallen out of favor as a
primary mode of transportation; both of these factors largely precluded its ability to exert
oppressive force over the citizenry more broadly. Nonetheless, in the nationalization acts of the
early 1970s, Congressional considerations still indicate that there was broad consensus that the
railroad should be regulated and controlled as a public good. While Congress and the President
expressed interest in saving the railroad, it was largely due to the potential economic fallout and
the salvaging of railroad jobs. However, throughout the decade of the 1970s, the previous
railroadrelated legislation was oriented more towards preserving railroad service because of its
integral relationship to the public interest and as a component of the nation’s vital transportation
network. These bills largely followed in the path of the Interstate Commerce Act and 
Munn
in
portraying the railroad as vital to the national wellbeing.
In short, the 1970s represents sharp and drastic change in policy. Furthermore, this
change was not only surficial, but seems to reflect a more fundamental change in the mindset of
political elites towards the railroad industry. However, much of the research in political science
seems to fall short when attempted to be applied to the changes of the 1970s. Primarily, the
literature on path dependence, mainly developed by Orren and Skowronek, seems to account for
the development of railroad regulation and nationalization policy up until the passage of the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act. However, the regulatory change under
the Staggers Act was anything but path dependent.
Paul Pierson, in his work 
Politics in Time
, defines path dependence as a phenomenon in
which specific patterns of timing and sequence matter, and under which “particular courses of
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action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse.”264 While scholars acknowledge
that there can be some amount of unpredictability inherent in path dependency, Pierson notes
that “each step along a path produces consequences that increase the relative attractiveness of
that path for the next round. As such affects begin to accumulate, they begin a powerful cycle of
selfreinforcing activity.”265 However, the scholarly literature on path dependence has generally
been applied only in what could be described as “loose” interpretations of the theory itself. The
essence the argument of path dependence, that historical policy sets a course for future
legislation is limited in its applicability, and scholars have often noted that this is so. Margaret
Levy, in her her 1996 piece on path dependence notes “path dependence has to mean, if it means
anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very
high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.”266 Furthermore, Sewell notes that
prior policies can affect future policy, but stops at this juncture.267 Policies are path dependant
insomuch as they may provide direction for later policy, but this description is by no means
applicable in all scenarios, let alone railroad regulatory policy.
The concept of path dependence has been cited throughout this work, especially when
describing the trajectory of railroad regulatory and nationalization policy between 1887 and
1976. However, this concept, at least as it has been presented in political science literature thus
far, does not adequately describe the change in railroad policy from nationalization to
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deregulation in the period between 1973 and 1980, between the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act and the Staggers Act. However, bringing to bear the circumstances of railroad regulatory
change to bear upon the conventional definitions of path dependency and thereby both modify
the current definitions of path dependence and also provide a better lens through which to
understand the regulatory changes of the 1970s. Furthermore, the theory of path dependence in
this context is best understood in conjunction with Orren and Skowronek theory of intercurrence,
which can be described the conflict between concurrent institutions which can lead to policy
changes.268 Of the factors described below, the second is best understood in light of the theory of
intercurrence.
Exogenous Shocks
While Pierson accounts for a modicum of change under his theory of path dependence, he
defines this change as “critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social
life.”269 However, elaboration upon the types, causes and effects of such “critical junctures” are
largely absent from Pierson’s work. However, given that path dependence is primarily an
economic theory, utilization of the economic definition of path dependency is useful for a fuller
appreciation thereof. While Pierson does apply economic definitions of path dependence to his
definition of the theory as a whole, he fails to account for the economic concept of “exogenous
shock.” Tatum defines exogenous shocks as unforeseen events that have the capacity to modify
existing political arrangements, stating that 
path dependence demonstrates why it is that change
is often resistant, while also implying that predicting stability with any certainty is impossible
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because of the power of random events
.” 270 Aklin and Urpelainen note that governments provide
strategic responses to exogenous shocks, such as a change in oil prices.271 However, they note
that the phenomenon of exogenous shocks has been insufficiently treated among political science
research.
The collapse of the northeastern railroad system seems to be a clear example of an
exogenous shock, and the response of the federal government to the crisis in the Staggers Act
presents a policy which does not seem to conform to the standard definition of path dependant
policy, even though policies had developed in a path dependent manner for almost a century and
for nearly a decade after the initial shock. Application of Pierson’s temporal process research, in
which he states that causes and path dependant outcomes may be separated temporally, helps us
to partially understand this.272 Development of this concept in light of the precipitous nature of
exogenous shocks would help to explain the phenomenon of railroad deregulation.
Executive Influence and Institutional Interaction
In addition to exogenous shocks, the change in railroad policy was largely precipitated by
the influence of the presidency. While the Nixon administration affected nationalization policies,
Nixon laid the groundwork for deregulation through his manipulation of Interstate Commerce
Committee appointments. The subsequent administrations of Ford and Carter provided further,
even more forceful pushes toward deregulatory policies and ultimately enacted them. Feasibly,
the change in railroad regulatory policy could have occurred at an earlier date, as the problems of
northeastern railroads had been accruing for a considerable amount of time. However, it was the
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drive given to deregulatory policy by the presidencies of Ford and Carter which ultimately lead
to its enactment. Railroad deregulation was certainly not inevitablethe continuation of
regulation and nationalization could very well have been a viable option.
In his book “The Politics Presidents Make,” Stephen Skowronek explains the concepts of
presidential regimes, and defines the order thereof as either adversarial to, or sympathetic with,
the established regime.273 In either circumstance, the ways in which the president relates with the
established order determines many of the ways in which they act.274 Interestingly, Nixon, who
largely opposed the principles of the establish Republican regime, was much less effective than
Ford and Carter in establishing policies which matched his, and his party’s, political preferences,
instead affecting the continuation of policy in a nationalistic direction.
The effect of the power of the presidency should not be overlooked when it comes to the
ways in which path dependency determines the outcomes of public policy. Given that there was
only a small period of time between the enactment of nationalistic legislation in Congress and
deregulatory policy and that the composition of Congress did not change significantly, it is not
illogical to attribute much of the shift in policy to the rhetoric forwarded by each of the
respective presidents. In order to provide a complete interpretation of the regulatory changes in
light of the narrative of path dependency, it is necessary to consider the role of other
governmental institutions, including the presidency. Orren and Skowronek in their book, “The
Search for American Political Development,” state that policy is developed in a
historicallydetermined fashion, but also advocate for the observation of crossinstitutional
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interaction in the development of public policy.275 Furthermore, the intercurrent relationship
between institutions, especially Congress and the presidency, can be cited as responsible for the
policy shift.276 Intercurrent relationships, note Orren and Skowronek, take place within the
uneven nature of political change, and therefore their timing and appearance can be irregular.277
The changes in the railroad regulatory system are not simply the outgrowth of a single
institution, and the nature and timing of their appearance can be attributed to the interaction
between the presidency and Congress.
In addition, the interaction between different policies forwarded by the federal
government can be a major factor in the determination of public policy. In large part, as
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the underlying problems of the railroad system can be attributed to
the enactment of policy which contributed to their downfall. The proliferation of the automobile
and truck transportation thanks to federal policy favorable to the construction of roads was a
major contributor to the collapse of the railroad industry. In addition, federal and state subsidies
for air travel also helped to cripple the industry.
While, according to Pierson, path dependency can accrue over time creating a feedback
loop, there is little discussion in the studies of temporal politics concerning the ability of one
policy to influence the path dependency of another.278 In the case of the railroad industry, the
onset of the railroad crisis may have been diverted had the federal government not enacted policy
which created an environment hostile to railroad profitability.
Ideological and Conceptual Shifts
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Research in this work has indicated that there were significant ideological shifts over
time which contributed to the changes in railroad policy. These were largely evident from the
discussion of the Congressional debates, in which there were notable changes in the ways federal
actors considered railroads. Primarily, these changes were concerned with the ways in which
Congress viewed railroads, either as an essential component of national infrastructure or as a
private industry which possessed the prerogative to accumulate wealth for its own gain. In
addition, the perceived salience of the railroad to the national transportation system also played a
role in how Congressional actors considered railroads.
Literature on path dependency and temporal politics is largely devoid of discussions of
ideological changes, despite their importance to the continuation of policy. The persistence of the
railroad regulatory regime can be attributed largely to path dependence and increasing returns on
change of the system, but the alteration of the conceptualization of railroads in public life was
largely responsible for the changes in the law.
Conclusion
The bifurcated nature of railroad policy in the 1970s can be attributed largely to the
concept of path dependency. Congress, since the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887, had considered railroads to be a public good, and had regulated them as such. Faced with
the cataclysmic downturn of the railroad industry in the 1970s, the initial legislative reaction on
the part of the federal government was nationalization. An outgrowth the regulatory policy of the
late 19th century, the legislation continued, in a path dependant manner, to treat railroads as a
public good providing an essential public service. However, by 1980, a divergent line of
legislation had appeared in the form of the Staggers Rail Act, which took regulatory power away
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from the federal government, acknowledged that railroads were a private industry which had a
right to accrue wealth and gave the railroads a wide breadth of selfdetermination in the disposal
of infrastructure which had formerly been considered critical to the nation’s transportation
network.
According to this work, the key to understanding the conundrum of the divergence of
railroad policy into two streams lies not only in the path dependant nature of railroad regulatory
policy, but also in the severe exogenous economic shock of the collapse of the northeastern
railroad system, the interaction of political institutions through the influence of presidential
agenda setting and the conflict of federal transportation policy. The concept of the intercurrent
relationship between institutions and the limitations of path dependence in political science help
us to understand not only why railroad policy became divergent in the 1970s, but also why it had
continued uninterrupted for such a considerable period of time. As a result, divergent railroad
policy was enacted which exists to the present in the form of a deregulated freight rail network
and nationalized passenger rail service.
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